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The purpose of this dissertation is to provide the means for contingency planners 
for regional earthquake risk mitigation to systematically determine how much to spend 
on mitigation versus post-event reconstruction and to prioritize alternative mitigation 
and reconstruction options.  
This dissertation is organized into three chapters. The focus of chapter one is the 
development of a method to estimate earthquake hazard for use in regional loss 
estimation. The method includes formulation of a linear program that selects a small 
subset of earthquake scenarios from a library of such events and estimates hazard-
consistent annual occurrence probabilities so that their combined effect on the region 
of interest approximates that described by r-year return period for all possible events. 
The method is reproducible, computationally tractable, and results in earthquake 
scenarios, which are easily understood. We apply it to the identification of earthquake 
scenarios for Tehran, Iran. 
The second chapter develops an optimization model to help highly seismically 
active developing countries decide: (1) How much should be spent on pre-earthquake 
mitigation versus waiting until after an event and paying for reconstruction or simply 
not rebuilding damaged buildings?; (2) Which buildings should be mitigated and 
how?; and (3) Which buildings should be reconstructed and how? It extends 
previously developed optimization models to consider the particular issues that arise in 
such countries. First, the model allows for the possibility that some damaged buildings 
   
will not be reconstructed immediately and keeps track of any lost building inventory. 
Second, it allows the set of possible mitigation alternatives to be both the upgrade of a 
particular structural type or a change in the structural type. Third, the model relaxes 
the assumption that all buildings should be reconstructed to their pre-earthquake 
condition. Finally, it includes as one objective minimizing the chance of an extremely 
high death toll in any one earthquake as well as minimizing the average annual death 
toll across earthquakes. This chapter incorporates the results from the first chapter into 
a case study analysis for Tehran, Iran 
The focus of the third chapter is the introduction of equity into this type of 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER1  IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD-CONSISTENT PROBABILISTIC 
EARTHQUAKE SCENARIOS FOR REGIONAL LOSS ESTIMATION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
This paper describes a regional earthquake hazard assessment method for use in 
loss estimation. It was developed especially for situations in which the desired output 
is probability of exceedence vs. loss curves for every site in a region (or r-year return 
period maps), computational demands are of concern, and the spatial coherence of 
individual earthquake scenarios is desirable. Computation may be of particular 
concern: (1) when computationally intensive analyses are conducted following the 
hazard analysis, as when one estimates damage to lifeline network for each possible 
earthquake scenario, then estimates service restoration times for each damage scenario 
(e.g., in Çağnan et al. 2006), or (2) when loss estimation must be repeated many times, 
as when evaluating the relative benefits of many mitigation alternatives (e.g., in Dodo 
et al. 2005). Retaining coherent individual earthquake scenarios can be desirable 
because they are easy for stakeholders to understand (e.g., Anderson 1997) and they 
capture the spatial correlation of ground motion across a region.  
The method presented herein is a new formulation of the hazard-consistent 
probabilistic scenario approach introduced by Chang et al. (2000). It similarly involves 
selecting a relatively small subset of all possible earthquakes and adjusting their 
annual occurrence probabilities so that each of the reduced set of events represents all 
events ―like that one‖ in terms of the frequency and distribution of ground motion it 
causes, and together the reduced set of events represents the total regional seismic 
hazard. However, the method introduced in this paper is novel in three key ways. For 
the first time, it uses a constrained optimization formulation to estimate the adjusted 
hazard-consistent occurrence probabilities for the reduced set of events. Unlike 
previous versions of the hazard-consistent probabilistic scenario method, this 
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formulation guarantees the minimum possible error between the regional hazard as 
estimated by the reduced set and by a full probabilistic seismic hazard analysis. It also 
allows the optimization to determine which events should be included rather than 
forcing the user to identify the reduced set of events a priori, without a full 
understanding of the implications of the choice in terms of accuracy and computation. 
Finally, it clarifies the magnitude and distribution of errors so that the user can make 
informed decisions about the tradeoff between computational savings and introduction 
of errors. In a case study for Tehran, Iran, with 8 earthquakes, the method provides 
unbiased results with errors that are small enough for most practical uses. The method 
is described and illustrated for earthquakes, but it can easily be adapted for hurricanes 
and other hazards.  
Available earthquake hazard assessment methods are compared in the next section. 
The new formulation and a case study application for Tehran, Iran are then described. 
The paper concludes with a summary of the method’s strengths and limitations. 
1.2 EARTHQUAKE HAZARD ASSESSMENT FOR USE IN REGIONAL LOSS 
ESTIMATION 
This section summarizes available earthquake hazard assessment methods in terms 
of their potential to be used in regional loss estimation: (1) individual scenarios, (2) 
probabilistic seismic hazard assessment (PSHA), (3) deaggregated PSHA, (4) Monte 
Carlo simulation, and (5) hazard-consistent probabilistic scenarios (HCPS). Except for 
the first, they all incorporate the effects of all possible events and their occurrence 
probabilities and result in r-year return period maps of loss for a region (as opposed to 
a single site). Crowley and Bommer (2006) provides a helpful overview of the first 
four of these methods.  
  3 
1.2.1 Individual Scenarios  
In what is often called the deterministic approach, one particular scenario event is 
specified and losses are estimated conditional on occurrence of that scenario. 
Magnitude, location, and perhaps other parameters typically define a scenario. Ground 
motion is estimated using the median or median plus one standard deviation point in 
the attenuation relation. Scenario ground motion and loss maps provide a coherent 
story of what might happen in a particular future earthquake, and thus can be 
invaluable for communication with stakeholders. Compared to PSHA, focusing on one 
or a few individual earthquake scenarios allows estimation of more ground motion 
characteristics that can be important in seismic design, such as duration or full 
acceleration time histories. However, for many decisions, such as insurance portfolio 
planning or regional mitigation resource allocation, it is important to consider all 
possible future earthquakes because what is an optimal decision under the occurrence 
of one earthquake might be completely ineffective if a different earthquake occurs. In 
those cases, loss exceedence curves or r-year return period maps can be useful. 
1.2.2 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis 
In probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA), the effects of all possible 
earthquakes with different sizes, occurring at different locations with different 
probabilities of occurrence are integrated to determine the probability of exceeding 
different levels of ground motion (e.g., peak ground acceleration) at a site of interest 
during a specified period of time (e.g., Reiter 1990). For a single site, the hazard curve 
derived from PSHA can be convolved with exposure and vulnerability information to 
obtain a loss exceedence curve (see Bazzurro and Luco 2005 for the formulation). 
When considering multiple sites, however, the situation is complicated because 
correlation among ground motions at the different sites must be considered. FEMA 
366 applies the single-site PSHA approach to every site in a region independently 
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without considering spatial correlation in the ground motion (FEMA 2001). Crowley 
and Bommer (2006) compare that approach to simulation for a case study in Turkey, 
demonstrating how this application of PSHA works for a single site, but overestimates 
the loss exceedence curve when applied to multiple sites. As they explain, the PSHA 
method effectively treats all ground motion variability as inter-event (earthquake-to-
earthquake) variability, whereas most of it is actually intra-event (spatial) variability. 
In other words, it assumes that ground motions at different sites are perfectly 
correlated. The ground motion associated with a particular exceedence probability at 
one site, and the ground motion associated with the same exceedence probability at 
another site do not necessarily occur together; PSHA-based loss estimation assumes 
they do. It is theoretically possible to extend the PSHA formulation to estimate losses 
while accounting for spatial correlation, but it is difficult in practice. Rhoades and 
McVerry (2001) extend PSHA to estimate the joint ground motion hazard at multiple 
sites. Wesson and Perkins (2001) provide a method to estimate the mean and variance 
(although not the entire distribution) of losses to a portfolio. 
1.2.3 Deaggregated PSHA 
Recognizing the benefits of scenario earthquakes, a great deal of research has 
focused on identifying one or a few design earthquakes that are compatible in some 
sense with a certain hazard level (e.g., Ishikawa and Kameda 1988, McGuire 1995, 
Bazzurro and Cornell 1999). (These design earthquakes are sometimes called ―hazard-
consistent,‖ but with a different meaning than that used in this paper.) These efforts 
have aimed to identify a single or few design earthquakes that can provide a detailed 
representation of ground motion for seismic design. They have not been intended for 
use in estimating regional losses. Nevertheless, as Crowley and Bommer (2006) 
describe, it is theoretically possible to use deaggregated scenarios in regional 
earthquake loss estimation although it would require a large computational effort 
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because all contributing scenarios must be considered. Campbell and Seligson (2003), 
described below, can be considered a type of deaggregation approach. 
1.2.4 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation (also called the walkthrough or event-based method) 
provides an alternate method for regional loss estimation that retains the ability to 
identify the contributions of specific earthquake events to the regional risk. It involves 
simulating the occurrence of many earthquakes in the region of interest (on the order 
of tens of thousands); estimating the losses caused by each earthquake; and using the 
resulting database of losses to calculate the loss-exceedence curves. Simulation has 
recently become more common (e.g., Crowley and Bommer 2006, Bazzurro and Luco 
2005, Ebel and Kafka 1999, Werner et al. 2006, and He 2006). There are many 
variations in the details of how each earthquake, its characteristics, and the resulting 
ground motion are simulated. For example, earthquakes may be simulated based on a 
historical earthquake catalogue; or by simulating location, magnitude, and other 
characteristics to create synthetic earthquakes. (It is interesting to note that simulation 
has long been the dominant approach for hurricanes since hurricane scenarios are not 
easily defined by just a couple parameters like magnitude and location, and therefore, 
a PSHA-based approach cannot be used for hurricane loss estimation.) 
This approach has the advantages of being straightforward conceptually; 
representing the spatial correlation among sites; and allowing explicit incorporation of 
temporal changes in hazard, exposure, vulnerability, or economic parameters (Jain and 
Davidson 2007, Taylor et al. 2001). Nevertheless, the simulation method can be 
computationally intensive, which may be problematic if the analysis must be repeated 
many times or if many analyses build on the initial hazard assessment. Werner et al. 
(2006) discusses post-sampling variance reduction techniques that can reduce the 
number of simulations required by a factor of three or more. 
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1.2.5 Hazard-Consistent Probabilistic Scenarios 
The hazard-consistent probabilistic scenario (HCPS) approach estimates losses the 
same way the simulation method does, but it offers a different way to identify the set 
of earthquakes that are simulated and their mean annual occurrence probabilities. A 
relatively small subset of all possible earthquakes is identified (on the order of tens), 
and the annual occurrence probability of each is adjusted so that each of the subset of 
events represents all events ―like that one‖ in terms of the frequency and distribution 
of ground motion it causes, and together the subset of events with their adjusted 
hazard-consistent occurrence probabilities represent the total regional hazard.  
Chang et al. (2000) first developed this approach and applied it in Southern 
California. Without explaining how exactly, they identified a set of 47 earthquakes. To 
estimate the hazard-consistent occurrence probability for each scenario, they tried to 
match the regional ground shaking produced by the reduced set of 47 earthquakes to 
that produced by a PSHA conducted with the full set of all possible earthquakes. 
Specifically, they matched several points on the hazard curve at a single location (Los 
Angeles city hall), and the 475-year ground motion at the centroids of 16 particular 
census tracts. Hazard-consistent occurrence probabilities were adjusted iteratively and 
manually until the match was considered to be within ―reasonable bounds.‖  
Campbell and Seligson (2003) provides a more objective, reproducible version of 
the HCPS method. They assume the reduced set of earthquakes is comprised of only 
maximum credible events (MCEs) with moment magnitude of at least 6.5. An 
application for Los Angeles included 17 scenarios. To estimate the adjusted hazard-
consistent occurrence probabilities for those reduced set earthquakes, they match 
system-wide average ground motion values (averaged over all grid points in the 
system of interest) one hazard bin at a time, where each bin k is an interval on a hazard 
(annual probability of exceedence vs. ground motion) curve. The average system-wide 
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hazard associated with bin k as given by a full PSHA is distributed among the MCEs 
that contribute significantly to it, in proportion to their contributions. That provides an 
annual occurrence probability for the MCE for each bin. The mean ground motion 
associated with each MCE and grid point is then adjusted so that the system-wide 
average value equals the average of the ground motion values in each bin k. This 
adjustment accounts for the fact that each scenario may not have been contributing to 
the bin k at its mean value (K. Campbell, personal communication, 2007). The result 
of this analysis is, for each bin k, a set of MCEs, each described by its soil-amplified 
ground motion map and its annual frequency. The set of scenarios may be different for 
each bin, which may be less intuitively appealing than one set of earthquakes, each 
with a single annual frequency. This method could also be considered a type of 
deaggregation method in which the deaggregation is done by earthquake, rather than 
separately by magnitude, distance, and epsilon as in the other methods mentioned in 
the Deaggregated PSHA section.  
Unlike the other HCPS methods (including the one presented in this paper), 
Campbell and Seligson (2003) in effect approximate the hazard curve as a step 
function, then match it perfectly. The effect of reducing the number of bins (and 
computation) on the resulting error is not clear. Further, because the match is based on 
a system-wide average, it is not clear how uniform the resulting errors are across the 
study region. 
In Lee et al. (2005), from an initial set of earthquakes based on all regional faults, 
the reduced set was determined such that they all caused at least a threshold level of 
ground motion in the study region and there were not multiple events with similar 
magnitudes and high correlation in ground motion they caused. For an analysis of a 
water supply system in Los Angeles, this process resulted in a set of 59 scenarios. An 
unconstrained optimization was conducted to estimate the hazard-consistent 
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occurrence probabilities for each of those 59 earthquakes (J. Lee, personal 
communication, 2006). An error function was defined to represent the difference, at a 
set of 56 distributed grid points, between the regional hazard estimated by the reduced 
set of events and that represented by the full PSHA. The error function was defined as 
the sum of errors when uncertainty in the ground motion prediction equation was and 
was not considered. For the former component, 5 points on the hazard curve were 
matched (for 10- to 2475-year return periods); for the latter, 19 points were. The errors 
calculated in each case were normalized so that they were weighted equally in the 
optimization. In all cases, the error for a particular grid point was defined as 
[ln(Pr/Pf)]
2
, where Pr and Pf are the annual exceedence probabilities for the reduced 
set and the full set of events, respectively (J. Lee, personal communication, 2006). The 
Pr are the values estimated by the optimization. The logarithm was used so that the 
points in the high exceedence probability range of the hazard curve did not have undue 
influence. The errors for the case without ground motion uncertainty were included 
because the users anticipated using only the mean attenuation relations when applying 
the reduced set of events. The optimization was solved using the variable metric 
method, which does not guarantee a global minimum.  
The HCPS approach has the advantages of including the contributions of 
earthquakes on all regional faults and preserving the coherence of particular scenarios 
(as compared to PSHA), while reducing the computational demands significantly 
compared to using a full historical or synthetic earthquake set. Spatial correlation is 
not explicitly addressed in any of the hazard-consistent probabilistic scenario methods 
(including the one in this paper). However, their ability to capture spatial correlation 
can be assumed to be somewhere between PSHA, which incorrectly assumes perfect 
correlation, and Monte Carlo simulation which, to the extent that it includes all 
possible earthquakes, does capture spatial correlation. Since the HCPS method is like 
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a simulation with a smaller set of carefully chosen earthquakes, they implicitly, 
partially capture spatial correlation. To some extent, including more earthquakes in the 
final reduced set is likely to lead to a better representation of the true spatial 
correlation, but the exact relationship between number of events and match to the true 
spatial correlation is unknown. Thus, a tradeoff exists between fully capturing spatial 
correlation but at a high computational cost with a full Monte Carlo simulation, and 
partially capturing spatial correlation with a lower computational cost with a HCPS 
method. The most appropriate choice of method will depend on the intended use. 
Further, all of these methods determine the reduced set of earthquakes and their 
associated hazard-consistent occurrence probabilities based on matching according to 
a single ground motion parameter (e.g., PGA), so the extent to which the reduced set 
accurately represents other ground motion parameters or collateral hazards like 
liquefaction, for example, remains unknown.  
Unlike the method presented in this paper, (1) none of these three hazard-
consistent probabilistic scenario methods guarantees the minimum possible error 
between the regional hazard as estimated by the reduced set and by a full probabilistic 
seismic hazard analysis, (2) all require the user to identify the reduced set of events a 
priori, without a full understanding of the implications of the choice in terms of 
accuracy and computation, and (3) none explores the effect of modeling decisions on 
the resulting error or the implications of the resulting error for subsequent loss 
estimation or other analyses. 
1.3 METHOD 
1.3.1 Overall Method 
The method we developed for characterizing earthquake hazard for use in regional 
loss estimation includes three main steps: (1) Identify a set of candidate earthquakes, 
(2) select a reduced set of earthquakes from the candidate set, and (3) determine 
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hazard-consistent annual occurrence probabilities for each earthquake in the reduced 
set. In the first step, the goal is to identify a candidate set of earthquakes such that each 
is physically realistic, and together they cover the study region and the full range of 
possible ground shaking intensity, so that a subset of them can adequately match the 
―true‖ regional hazard. Candidate events may include historical, maximum credible, or 
user-defined earthquakes; or area sources. Note that unlike a full PSHA in which it is 
critical to include all possible sources, in the HCPS approach, if a possible source is 
omitted, it just means that it will be unavailable for selection in the final reduced set. 
Only a small number are selected for the reduced set anyway. If the errors obtained 
from the analysis are acceptably small, the user can conclude that the candidate set 
was adequate; if not, the candidate set could be expanded and the analysis redone. 
An optimization model accomplishes the second and third steps together so as to 
make the regional hazard estimated by the earthquakes in the reduced set match the 
―true‖ regional hazard as well as possible (Figure  1-1). Regional hazard is represented 
by the hazard curves (annual probability of exceedence vs. ground shaking) for all 
control points in the study region, or equivalently, a set of r-year return period ground 
shaking maps. Ground shaking can be in terms of any scalar metric, such as peak 
ground acceleration (PGA) or spectral acceleration at period T (Sa(T)). In the case 
study, we use PGA in g. Control points may be census zone centroids, evenly-spaced 
grid points, locations of key facilities of interest, or any other user-specified locations 
in the study region. The ―true‖ regional hazard is assumed to be that determined by a 
full probabilistic seismic hazard analysis or Monte Carlo simulation, as represented by 
a set of r-year return period maps. The hazard curve at each control point is 
approximated by the points associated with those r-year return periods (Figure  1-1). 
The set of control point-return period combinations are the matching points.  
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Figure ‎1-1 Schematic defining errors between ―true‖ and reduced set hazard curves 
for control point i 
1.3.2 Optimization Model Formulation 
The objective of the optimization is to minimize the sum of the errors, over all 
control points and return periods, between points on the ―true‖ hazard curves and the 
corresponding points on hazard curves developed with the reduced set of earthquakes 
and hazard-consistent annual occurrence probabilities (Figure  1-1): 
 
1 1
( )
M R
ir ir
i r
Min e e 
 
  (1.1) 
where ire  and 

ire  are the errors resulting from overestimating and underestimating, 
respectively, the ―true‖ hazard curve for return period r at control point i. The error ire  
is positive if the ―true‖ value is overestimated and zero otherwise; ire  is positive if the 
―true‖ value is underestimated and zero otherwise. 
Suppose Pj is the hazard-consistent annual occurrence probability for earthquake 
(1, )j N , N is the number of candidate earthquakes, Yi,r is the ground shaking from 
the ―true‖ hazard curve for return period r at control point i, and yi,j is the ground 
shaking at control point i caused by earthquake j. The following constraint defines the 
error terms, for each control point-return period combination, as the difference 
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between the ―true‖ annual exceedence probability, 1/r, and the annual exceedence 
probability estimated using the reduced set of earthquakes: 
 , , , ,
1
1
{ * ( )} ,
N
j i j i r i r i r
j
P P y Y e e i r
r
 

      (1.2) 
If c is the annual probability that no earthquake occurs and the probability of two 
or more earthquakes in a unit time is negligible compared to the probability of only 
one, we can assume the sum of no earthquake and all possible earthquakes equals one:  
 
1
1
N
j
j
P c

   (1.3) 
Finally, the probability of earthquake j must be between 0 and Pmax, where 
0Pmax1, and the errors must be nonnegative.  
 max0 jP P j    (1.4) 
 , 0 ,ir ire e i r
     (1.5) 
One would typically assume Pmax=1, but if desired, the user can specify a Pmax<1. 
While the probabilities estimated by the model for each earthquake are really for all 
―earthquakes like that one‖ and not the probability of a single event, it may be 
awkward to explain a very large value of Pj. Hence, it may be desirable to include a 
limit significantly less than one. Including an arbitrary limit Pmax<1 may result in a 
worse match between the reduced set and ―true‖ hazard because it adds an additional 
constraint. It will also tend to increase the number of earthquakes identified by the 
model, which may be undesirable because the larger the set of earthquakes the more 
computation is required in subsequent analyses. The value of Pmax is the user’s 
decision and should depend on the particular analysis. In the case study, we conduct 
the analysis with Pmax equal to 0.05 and 1 and compare the solutions.  
The optimization model is a linear program in which the objective function is 
given in Expression (1.1) and the constraints are given in Expressions (1.2) to (1.5). 
The model determines the hazard-consistent annual occurrence probability Pj for every 
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earthquake j in the candidate set. If Pj=0, earthquake j is not included in the reduced 
set of earthquakes. It also provides the errors, rie ,  and 

rie , , for each control point i and 
return period r, so the user can see how big the errors are and how they are distributed.  
1.4 CASE STUDY 
This section presents a case study application of the model for Tehran, the capital, 
and political and economic center of Iran. Tehran is located at the foot of the Alborz 
Mountains, which form part of the Alps-Himalayan Orogenic Zone. It is a highly 
seismic area surrounded by many active faults. Tehran’s population has exploded in 
recent decades, growing from 1.0 to 7.0 million from 1950 to 2000 (UN 2002).  
1.4.1 Input Data 
The optimization model requires as input: (1) a candidate set of earthquakes, (2) 
the ―true‖ ground shaking Yi,r associated with each control point i and return period r; 
(3) the probability that candidate earthquake j will cause ground shaking greater than 
or equal to Yi,r at control point i, , ,( )i j i rP y Y , for every i-j-r combination; (4) the 
annual probability of no earthquake, c; and if desired, (5) the user-defined maximum 
allowable occurrence probability, Pmax, of each earthquake j. For the case study, the 
candidate set of earthquakes was based on an earthquake catalogue developed as part 
of a microzoning study of the Greater Tehran Area conducted by the Japan 
Cooperation International Agency (JICA) for the government of Iran (JICA et al. 
2000). The JICA database includes 6,114 historical events from 734 to 1999. For each, 
the database contains the latitude and longitude of the epicenter, date, and magnitude 
in Mw (which were converted to Ms, assuming Ms=Mw+0.1).  
The Yi,r, , ,( )i j i rP y Y , and c values were based on a probabilistic seismic hazard 
analysis of Tehran by Amiri et al. (2003). In that study, the authors compiled a 
catalogue of historical and instrumental events in a 200 km radius of Tehran, from the 
4
th
 century BC to 1999. The logic tree method was used to integrate two methods of 
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estimating seismicity parameters, and three attenuation relationships. Kijko (2000) and 
Tavakoli (1996), considered appropriate for regions in which there is substantial 
uncertainty in the earthquake catalogue, were used to estimate seismicity parameters. 
Because of uncertainty in the catalogue, specific earthquakes could not be related to 
specific sources, so both studies determined a single set of seismicity parameters for 
the Tehran study region. The attenuation relationships were based on Iranian (Ramazi 
1999), regional (Ambraseys and Bommer 1991), and global (Sarma and Srbulov 1996) 
earthquake catalogues. Seismic hazard assessment was conducted for 132 evenly 
spaced grid points in Tehran using SEISRISK III software (Bender and Perkins 1987). 
In our case study, the control points were taken as the centroids of the 3,070 
census zones in Tehran. We selected the 198 events from the JICA catalogue for 
which 4≤Ms<6 and D≤200 km, or Ms≥6 and D≤500 km, where D is the epicentral 
distance from the center of Tehran. Other earthquakes are not expected to cause 
significant ground shaking in Tehran, and thus were not considered. To ensure 
coverage of higher intensity ground shaking, we included an additional 8 earthquakes 
that Amiri et al. (2003) identified as the maximum earthquakes associated with the 8 
main faults near Tehran. Figure  1-2 shows the locations of the 198 events from the 
JICA historical database and the 8 faults identified by Amiri et al. (2003). The 8 faults 
with their maximum magnitudes are (Amiri et al. 2003): Mosha 7.5, North Tehran 6.9, 
Niavaran 6.0, North Rey 6.1, South Rey 6.2, Kahrizak 6.6, Garmsar 6.9, and Pishva 
6.5. Fault locations were obtained from the JICA et al. (2000) study. The ground 
shaking values Yi,r were obtained by digitizing 475-year and 950-year return period 
PGA maps from Amiri et al. (2003). 
Since these were the only return period maps available, only r=475 and r=950 
were considered. This means the hazard curves at each census zone is approximated 
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by two points. If we had access to the complete PSHA, more return periods could 
easily be considered, providing a better description of the hazard. 
 
Figure ‎1-2 Earthquakes included in the candidate set of events, 198 epicenters and 
MCEs for 8 faults 
Following Amiri et al. (2003), a logic tree approach was used to calculate the 
probability that each candidate earthquake j would cause ground shaking greater than 
or equal to Yi,r at census zone i, , ,( )i j i rP y Y , for every i-j-r combination. The Ramazi 
(1999), Ambraseys and Bommer (1991), and Sarma and Srbulov (1996) attenuation 
relationships were each applied and a weighted average of the values was used, where 
the weights were, from Amiri et al. (2003), 0.4, 0.35, and 0.25, respectively. 
Specifically, we used the hard site equation in Ramazi (1999), Eq. 7 in Ambraseys and 
Bommer (1991), and Eq. 6 in Sarma and Srbulov (1996). In Ramazi (1999), since no 
distribution was specified, based on the form of the equation, we assumed that ln(ah) is 
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normally distributed with a mean of ln(ah) and standard deviation of 0.62 (estimated to 
be similar to the distribution in the other two relations).  
The annual probability of no earthquake occurring that would affect the study 
region, c, was taken to be one minus the annual probability of an earthquake with 
Ms≥4 within 200 km of Tehran. From Amiri et al. (2003), c=0.505. We ran the 
analysis for two possible values of Pmax (0.05 and 1) to see the effect of imposing that 
constraint.  
1.4.2 Errors in terms of PGA 
The errors in the model formulations are defined in terms of probabilities (vertical 
differences between the curves in Figure  1-1, rie ,  and 

rie , , but it is easier to interpret 
errors defined in terms of the ground shaking parameter, PGA (horizontal differences 
in Figure  1-1, ,i rf
  and ,i rf
 . To translate the probability error for census zone i and 
return period r into the associated PGA error, we first use the reduced set of 
earthquakes to develop a new hazard curve for each census zone (as in Figure  1-1). 
This is done by calculating the annual probability of exceeding each PGA value, y, in 
the range of interest as ,
reduced set
* ( )j i j
j
P P y y

 , where Pj is the optimization-
estimated annual occurrence probability for earthquake j and ,( )i jP y y  are 
calculated using the logic tree approach described in the Input Data section. 
Interpolating on the hazard curve, we then find the reduced set estimated PGA 
associated with return period r, and compare it to the ―true‖ PGA, ,i rY , for census zone 
i and return period r. To facilitate interpretation, results are presented in terms of PGA 
errors. 
1.4.3 Results 
The linear optimization model was solved using AMPL software, with CPLEX by 
ILOG, for both Pmax=1.0 (Model1.0) and Pmax=0.05 (Model0.05). We first present results 
for Model1.0, then compare them to Model0.05 results. Figure  1-3 shows the historical 
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earthquakes selected in one or both models, and Table  1-1 lists the hazard-consistent 
annual occurrence probability Pj estimated for each. Eight of the 206 candidate 
earthquakes were selected in Model1.0, with two having large hazard-consistent 
occurrence probabilities of 0.34 and 0.12. (Note that Pj does not represent the 
occurrence probability of a single real earthquake, but rather all earthquakes ―like that 
one,‖ so it should not necessarily be of the same magnitude as typically seen.)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1-3 Earthquakes selected in Model0.5 and/or Model1.0 with earthquake number 
or fault name 
Figure  1-4 and Figure  1-5 show the geographic distribution of 475-year and 950-
year PGAs, respectively, estimated with the Model1.0 reduced earthquake set. 
Figure  1-6 and Figure  1-7 show the Model1.0 errors (reduced set PGA minus ―true‖ 
PGA) for 475 and 950 years, respectively, which indicate no discernible geographic 
pattern. (Figures are in UTM-WGS84, Zone 39N.) 
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Table ‎1-1 Earthquakes selected in each model run with corresponding Pj values 
EQ ID or fault 
name 
Magnitude Pj for Model1.0 Pj for 
Model0.05 
1 7.1 0.1241 0.0500 
2 7.0 0.0001 0.0003 
7 7.7 0.0025 — 
15 7.1 0.0112 0.0290 
23 7.6 — 0.0500 
24 6.4 0.3425 0.0500 
34 6.6 — 0.0500 
35 7.0 — 0.0500 
54 5.4 — 0.0500 
62 6.7 — 0.0484 
87 4.1 0.0064 0.0083 
Garmsar MCE 6.9 — 0.0500 
Kahrizak MCE 6.6 0.0037 0.0037 
North Tehran 
MCE 
6.9 0.0044 0.0057 
Pishva MCE 6.5 — 0.0500 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1-4 Model1.0 reduced set PGA (g) for 475-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-5 Model1.0 reduced set PGA (g) for 950-year return period 
 
 
Figure ‎1-6 Model1.0 error for 475-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-7 Model1.0 error for 950-year return period 
Figure  1-8 shows a histogram of the errors for Model1.0, with one observation for 
each return period-census zone. Since PGA is typically modeled as having a 
lognormal probability distribution, Figure  1-8 is in terms of ln(reduced set PGA) – 
ln(―true‖ PGA). With a mean of 0.006, median of -0.001, and positive skew of 1.1, 
Figure  1-8 shows an approximately normal distribution with little bias and small errors 
in general. There is no statistically significant difference in the errors by return period 
and no outliers of concern. In terms of PGA, both the expected value and median error 
are 0.003g (or 1%), 84% of errors are within ±0.02g, and 95% of errors are within 
±0.04g. In practical terms, for this case study, the errors are not large enough to affect 
damage and loss estimations, and will be dominated by the uncertainty in other aspects 
of loss estimation. 
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Figure ‎1-8 Histogram of errors (ln(reduced set PGA) minus ln(―true‖ PGA)) for 
Model1.0 
To understand why the selected earthquakes were chosen and how each 
contributes to matching the ―true‖ hazard, we define the contribution of earthquake j 
to matching the ―true‖ hazard associated with census zone i and return period r as:   
 
, ,
, ,
( )
( )
r
j i j i r
j i j i r
j J
P P y Y
P P y Y



 (1.6) 
 
where Jr is the reduced set of earthquakes. The contributions vary greatly by census 
zone and return period, with a few earthquakes contributing much more than the 
others. If we average the contributions over all census zones and both return periods, 
the eight earthquakes contribute 44% (MCE on North Tehran fault), 19% (MCE on 
Kahrizak fault), 13% (earthquake 7), 12% (earthquake 24), 6% (earthquake 1), 3% 
(earthquake 15), 2% (earthquake 2) and 2% (earthquake 87), respectively. 
Figure  1-9shows the geographic distribution of contribution for the MCE on the North 
Tehran fault for the 475-year return period. Notice that this earthquake contributes 
significantly to the match in most of the region except the south.  
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
3 0
0
.0
3
0
.0
6
0
.0
9
0
.1
2
+
ln( reduced set PGA / "true" PGA )
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
  22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1-9 Map of Tehran showing the contribution (defined in Eq. 6) for the MCE 
earthquake on the North Tehran fault for Model1.0 and the 475-year return period. 
To see the effect of setting a maximum allowable annual occurrence probability 
for each earthquake, we compare the results from the two models. The objective 
function values are 0.820 and 0.927 for Model1.0 and Model0.05, respectively, 
indicating that imposing the additional constraint on Pmax results in a worse match to 
the ―true‖ hazard. However, the PGA errors for the two models are comparable in 
terms of distribution, magnitude, and practical significance. For Model0.05, both the 
expected value and median error are 0.006g, 78% of errors are within ±0.02g, and 
93% of errors are within ±0.04g (versus 0.003g, 84%, and 95% for Model1.0). The two 
solutions are essentially equally good and the choice between them depends on the 
intended use. As expected, Model0.05 resulted in more earthquakes in the reduced set, 
14 instead of 8 (Figure 3). Eight of the 14 earthquakes in the Model0.05 solution have 
max 0.05P  , indicating that the constraint restricting the maximum probability for an 
earthquake was binding.  
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The more matching points (i.e., return period-census zone combinations) there are, 
the more complete the representation of the ―true‖ hazard. However, in general, one 
would expect more matching points and more constraints to make it more difficult to 
closely match the ―true‖ hazard. More earthquakes in the reduced set will generally 
improve the match.  
1.5 CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a new formulation of the hazard-consistent probabilistic 
scenario approach to representing regional earthquake hazard for use in loss 
estimation. A set of candidate earthquakes is identified, and a linear program is used to 
select a reduced set of earthquakes and determine the hazard-consistent annual 
occurrence probability for each, such that together the earthquakes in the reduced set 
represent the ―true‖ regional hazard. Losses can then be estimated for each earthquake 
in the reduced set to obtain loss exceedence curves. The reduced set represents the 
contributions of all possible earthquakes, but requires far less computation than 
simulation with tens of thousands of synthetic earthquakes.  
The optimization formulation and solution method are novel in a few main ways. 
For the first time, they ensure that the error between the ―true‖ hazard and the reduced 
set hazard is minimized. They allow the model to select the earthquakes included in 
the reduced set, rather than requiring the user to do that a priori without understanding 
the implications of the choice for the final error. Finally, they clarify the magnitude 
and distribution of errors so that the user can make informed decisions about the 
tradeoff between computational savings and introduction of errors. The simple linear 
program formulation is easily solved for any size region. The method results in a 
single set of earthquake scenarios (unlike PSHA or Campbell and Seligson 2003), is 
reproducible, and can be adapted to other hazards. 
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Opportunities exist to extend this new formulation and overcome some limitations 
it shares with other HCPS methods. Currently the ―true‖ hazard is measured only by 
PGA. It would be possible, however, to add terms to the objective function that 
represent errors in other ground motion parameters or collateral hazards. One could 
also force errors to be smaller for certain census zones or return periods that are of 
particular interest by adding weights to penalize the corresponding error terms in the 
objective function. Although it would be less straightforward to do, future efforts 
might also try to minimize errors in spatial correlation. In any case, the method is only 
as good as the representation of ―true‖ hazard on which it is based. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix contains the following information in support of the paper titled 
―Identification of hazard-consistent probabilistic earthquake scenarios for regional loss 
estimation‖: 
1. Maps illustrating the digitized 475-year and 950-year return period 
PGA(g) maps from Amiri et al.(2003) 
2. Maps of errors (―reduced set‖ minus ―true‖ hazard) for Model0.05 for (a) 
475-year and (b) 950-year return periods in terms of PGA(g) 
3. The contributions of each earthquake in the reduced set for Model1.0 
and Model0.05 by census zone and return period 
4. Discussion and illustration of how to compute , ,( )i j i rP y Y  
All figures are in UTM-WGS84, Zone 39N. 
1. Digitized maps from Amiri et al.(2003) 
 
Figure ‎1-10 Map of 475-year return period bedrock PGA (g) in Tehran based on 
Amiri et al. (2003) 
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Figure ‎1-11 Map of 950-year return period bedrock PGA (g) in Tehran based on 
Amiri et al. (2003) 
 
 
2. Maps‎of‎errors‎(“reduced‎set”‎minus‎“true”‎hazard)‎for‎Model0.05 
 
Figure ‎1-12 Model0.05 error for 475-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-13 Model0.05 error for 950-year return period 
3. Maps of Contributions of Earthquakes 
All figures are in UTM-WGS84, Zone 39N and are based on Equation(1.7) 
 
Figure ‎1-14 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 2 for 
Model0.05 and the 475-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-15 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 15 for 
Model0.05 and the 475-year return period 
 
Figure ‎1-16 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 199 for 
Model0.05 and the 475-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-17 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 204 for 
Model0.05 and the 475-year return period 
 
 
Figure ‎1-18 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 205 for 
Model0.05 and the 475-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-19 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 2 for 
Model0.05 and the 950-year return period 
 
 
Figure ‎1-20 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 15 for 
Model0.05 and the 950-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-21 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 199 for 
Model0.05 and the 950-year return period 
 
Figure ‎1-22 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 204 for 
Model0.05 and the 950-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-23 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 205 for 
Model0.05 and the 950-year return period 
 
Figure ‎1-24 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 1 for 
Model1.0 and the 475-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-25 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 7 for 
Model1.0 and the 475-year return period 
 
Figure ‎1-26 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 24 for 
Model1.0 and the 475-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-27 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 199 for 
Model1.0 and the 475-year return period 
 
Figure ‎1-28 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 204 for 
Model1.0 and the 475-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-29 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 1 for 
Model1.0 and the 950-year return period 
 
 
Figure ‎1-30 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 7 for 
Model1.0 and the 950-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-31 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 24 for 
Model1.0 and the 950-year return period 
 
Figure ‎1-32 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 199 for 
Model1.0 and the 950-year return period 
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Figure ‎1-33 Map of Tehran showing the contribution for the earthquake ID 204 for 
Model1.0 and the 950-year return period 
4. Discussion and illustration of how to compute “exceedence‎probabilities” 
This paper tries to match the estimated annual exceedence probabilities to the 
―true‖ exceedence probability of the map, 1/r as shown in constraint (2) in the paper 
which is also shown in equation(1.8): 
   , , , ,
1
1
* ,
N
j i j i r i r i r
j
P P y Y e e i r
r
 

      (1.8) 
where Pj is the hazard-consistent annual occurrence probability for earthquake j(1, 
N), N is the number of candidate earthquakes, Yi,r is the ground shaking from the 
―true‖ hazard curve for return period r at control point i, and yi,j is the ground shaking 
at control point i caused by earthquake j, ire  and 

ire  are the error terms for 
overestimations and underestimations, respectively, and , ,( )i j i rP y Y  is called the 
―exceedence probability‖. This section describes the calculation of these exceedence 
probabilities , ,( )i j i rP y Y , which are coefficients in the optimization. Note that for the 
analysis in this paper we focus on PGA as the measure of ground shaking. 
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An ―exceedence probability‖ is the probability that when earthquake j occurs, the 
PGA at control point i will be greater than or equal to Yi,r.. The calculation of this 
probability is done using attenuation relationships.  
Attenuation relationships give the ground motion level (PGA in this paper) as a 
function of magnitude Mj, distance dij, and possibly other parameters to allow for 
different site types or fault styles (Field, 2007). All attenuation relationships are 
developed by fitting a curve to observations and these observations usually have 
significant scatter. This introduces uncertainty in the prediction of the fitted curve as 
illustrated in Figure  1-34.  
 
 
Figure ‎1-34 The scatter in the observations introduces uncertainty in the 
attenuation relationships. A lognormal distribution for PGA is often assumed with the 
mean value being the attenuation relationship (solid line) 
To represent the uncertainty in the calculation of these ground shaking values it is 
typically assumed that they will have a lognormal distribution around the calculated 
average value at any given control point i (at distance dij) with a constant standard 
deviation  which is estimated when the attenuation relationship is estimated (see 
Figure  1-34). Therefore, the probability that yijr exceeds Yi,r for the j
th
 earthquake at 
the i
th
 control point is given by equation (1.9) where F is the Normal cumulative 
distribution function with mean lnyij and standard deviation of  .  
P
G
A
 (
g
) 
Distance 
Mj 
yi,j 
dij (at control point i) 
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 , , ,( ) 1 (ln )i j i r Y i rP y Y F Y    (1.9) 
(Note that some attenuation relations use log10Yi,r instead of lnYi,r.). 
4.1. Calculations 
Since the calculations in this paper are based on the method proposed by  Amiri et 
al. (2003), the calculation of exceedence probabilities are done separately for each of 
the three attenuation relationships they have used (Ambraseys and Bommer, 1991; 
Sarma and Srbulov, 1996; Ramazi, 1999) and the weighted average of the three is 
used in Equation(1.2) of the paper. In other words, for every control point i, 
earthquake j, and return period r, the calculations consist of three main steps: 
1. Calculation of the mean yi,j using each attenuation relationship given in Amiri et 
al. (2003). 
2. Calculation of probability of exceeding Yi,r for each attenuation relationship 
3. Calculation of weighted average using the weights in Amiri et al. (2003) 
The details of the steps are as follows:  
 4.1.1.Calculate mean yi,j using each attenuation relation 
 (Ambraseys and Bommer, 1991) 
Based on Ambraseys and Bommer (1991), the mean value at every control point i, 
for every earthquake j is calculated by equation (1.10) 
 10 10log ( ) 1.09 0.238 log ( ) 0.28ij sy M r P      (1.10) 
y i,j  PGA in g 
Ms Surface wave magnitude 
r = (dij
2
+h0
2
)
1/2
 
dij  Shortest distance from the control point i to the surface projection of the fault 
rupture which is the source of the earthquake j in km 
h0  Constant with the value of 6 
P  0 for 50-percentile and 1 for 84 percentile. We use P=0 to get the median. 
  40 
 
It is assumed that log10 (yij) is normally distributed with mean calculated using 
Equation (1.10) (with P=0) and standard deviation of 0.28. 
(Sarma and Srbulov, 1996) 
Similarly, based on Sarma and Srbulov (1996), the mean value at every control 
point i, for every earthquake j is calculated by equation (1.11):  
10 10log ( ) 1.507 0.240 0.5421log ( ) 0.00397 0.26ij sy M r r       (1.11) 
Same definitions as in (1.10) except: 
h0  Constant with the value of 3 
 
It is assumed that log10 (yij) is normally distributed with mean calculated using 
Equation  (1.11) (with P=0) and standard deviation of 0.26. 
(Ramazi, 1999) 
Similarly, based on Ramazi (1999), the mean value at every control point i, for 
every earthquake j is calculated by equation(1.13):  
0.63
2.11 0.794000 *(20 ) , 16
9.81*100
M
ij ij ijy d H e H M d
      (1.12) 
or 
0.634000
ln( ) ln( ) 2.11*ln(20 ) 0.79 , 16
9.81*100
ij ij ijy d H M H M d        (1.13) 
Same definitions as in (1.10) except: 
M Paper does not specify the magnitude scale, so to be consistent with previous 
two attenuation relationships, Ms is assumed. 
We further assume that ln(yij) is normally distributed with mean calculated using 
Equation (1.13) and standard deviation of 0.62. The value of 0.62, corresponds to 0.27 
(like in the other attenuation relations) if log10(yij) is normally distributed, i.e., 
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10
0.27
=e
0.62
. Since this paper does not present a standard deviation value, we assume a 
standard deviation that it is similar to the other attenuation relationships.  
 4.1.2. Calculate probability of exceeding Yi,r for each attenuation relation 
For each attenuation relation, there is a normal distribution for either log(yij) or 
ln(yij). So, we use the equation describing a normal distribution to determine the 
probability of exceeding some specified probability Yi,r (e.g., 0.05g). This is done by 
using equation (1.9) for every attenuation relationship. For the 3 attenuations used in 
Amiri et al. (2003), the formulas in Microsoft Excel are: 
 
ij, Ambraseys and Bommer i,r
10 i,r
P (y   Y ) 
= 1-normcdf(log (Y ), mean from Equation (1.10), 0.28)
             

 (1.14) 
 
ij, Sarma and Srbulov i,r
10 i,r
P (y   Y ) 
= 1-normcdf(log (Y ), mean from Equation (1.11), 0.26)   

 (1.15) 
 
ij, Ramazi i,r
i,r
P (y   Y ) 
= 1-normcdf(ln(Y ), mean from Equation  (1.13), 0.62)

 (1.16) 
4.1.3.Take the weighted average probability of exceeding Yi,r over all 3 attenuations 
The weights for each of the three attenuation relation in Amiri et al. (2003) are 
0.35, 0.25, and 0.4 respectively. Therefore, the weighted average of the exceedence 
probability for every earthquake j, at a certain control point i, for a specific return 
period r with a corresponding ―true‖ ground shaking Yi,r  calculated by equation (1.17). 
This value is used in Equation(1.2) of the paper as , ,( )i j i rP y Y . 
 
ij i,r ij, Ambraseys and Bomme i,r
ij, Sarma and Srbulov i,r ij,Ramazi i,r
P(y  > Y ) = 0.35*P(y r > Y ) 
+ 0.25*P(y  > Y ) + 0.4*P(y > Y )     
 (1.17) 
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4.2.Example  
Consider census zones 1963 and 214 and earthquake 198 corresponding to the 
Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE) for the fault Mosha (Figure  1-35) with surface 
magnitude (Ms) of 7.5. Assume we are calculating the exceedence probabilities for the 
475-year return period map (r=475). Based on Amiri et al. (2003) the PGA for the 
zones 1963 and 214 in this map is 0.36g and 0.44g respectively (Y1963,475 and Y214,475). 
To do the calculations for these two zones, the shortest distance from the center of the 
zone to the fault is measured and the rest of the calculation is given equations (1.10) to 
(1.17) above. 
 
#
Zone 1963
#
Zone 214
MOSHA REVERSE FAULT
30 0 30 60 Kilometers
N
EW
S
 
Figure ‎1-35 Census zones 214 and 1963 and their distances to Mosha fault 
 
Distances d 1963, 199 and d214, 199 are 30.09 and 15.62 kilometers respectively. 
Step 1: The calculations for the mean values for the tree attenuation relationships are 
as follows: 
(Ambraseys and Bommer, 1991):  
10 1963,199 10
10 214,199 10
Zone 1963: log ( ) 1.09 0.238(7.5) log (30.6902) 0 -0.8073
Zone 214: log ( ) 1.09 0.238(7.5) log (16.7327) 0 -0.5369
y
y
     
     
 
d 214,199 
d 1963, 199 
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(Sarma and Srbulov, 1996): 
10 1963,199
10
10 214,199
10
Zone 1963: log ( )
1.507 0.240(7.5) 0.542log (30.2471) 0.00397*(30.2471) 0 -0.6275
Zone 214: log ( )
1.507 0.240(7.5) 0.542log (15.9055) 0.00397*(15.9055) 0 -0.4203
y
y
      
      
 
(Ramazi, 1999): 
 
1963,199
1963,199
1963: ln( )
4000
ln( ) 2.11*ln(20 30.098 17.0167) 0.79(7.5) -1.545
9.81*100
214 : ln( )
4000
ln( ) 2.11*ln(20 15.62 18.6951) 0.79(7.5) -1.0986
9.81*100
Zone y
Zone y
     
     
 
 
Step 2: The calculation of exceedance probabilities Based on equation (1.16) is as 
follows:  
i,199, Ambraseys and Bommer i,475
10
10
i,199, Sarma and 
P(y   Y ) 
for zone 1963: 1-normcdf(log (0.36), -0.8073, 0.28)= 0.097
= 
for zone 214: 1-normcdf(log (0.44), -0.5369, 0.28)= 0.2597 
               
P(y




Srbulov i,475
10
10
i,199, Ramazi i,475
  Y ) 
for zone 1963: 1-normcdf(log (0.36), -0.6275, 0.26)= 0.2398
= 
for zone 214: 1-normcdf(log (0.44), -0.4203, 0.26)= 0.4032
P(y  Y ) 
for zone 1963: 1-normcdf(ln(0
= 





.36), -1.545, 0.62)= 0.1993
                                
for zone 214: 1-normcdf(ln(0.44), -1.0986, 0.62)= 0.3272



 
 
Step 3: The calculation of weighted average of exceedance probabilities is as follows: 
i,199 i,475P(y   Y ) 
for zone 1963:0.35*0.097 + 0.25*0.2398 + 0.4*0.1993=  0.1736
=     
for zone 214: 0.35*0.4032 + 0.25*0.3272 + 0.4*0.3272= 0.3226




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Notice that the exceedence probabilities are much higher for the zone closer to the 
source of the ground motion. 
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CHAPTER2  RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR EARTHQUAKE RISK 
MITIGATION: CASE STUDY ON TEHRAN, IRAN 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are many barriers to the adoption and implementation of regional earthquake 
risk mitigation plans, including for example, difficulty getting the issue on the political 
agenda, difficulty coordinating among multiple layers of government (local, state, and 
federal), and an apparent disconnect between who pays the costs of mitigation and 
who receives its benefits (e.g., Prater and Lindell 2000). Even if one had the will and 
complete authority to implement a comprehensive regional earthquake mitigation 
plan, however, for many reasons, it is difficult to know what to do. A large and diverse 
group of stakeholders is involved, each with different, sometimes competing 
objectives, constraints, and available strategies. Even a single stakeholder may have 
multiple competing objectives, including, for example, minimizing total costs, 
minimizing the chance of an extremely large loss, or ensuring that benefits that arise 
from mitigation investments are equitably distributed. There are an overwhelming 
number of possible mitigation alternatives, each with a different cost and effect on the 
risk. For example, FEMA (2003) groups mitigation alternatives into 6 categories: 
prevention, property protection, public education and awareness, natural resource 
protection, emergency services, and structural projects. Within each of those 
categories, in a given context, there are numerous combinations of alternatives. 
Focusing on structural upgrades, for example, one would still have to decide which of 
thousands of structures to upgrade, how, and when. The problem dimensions expand 
further because of the many types of impact an earthquake can have, including for 
example, deaths, injuries, structural damage, business interruption, environmental 
damage, and induced damage. Moreover, impacts across a region are spatially 
correlated, which should be considered because it affects the variability of total 
regional losses. The regional earthquake risk mitigation decision problem is also 
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highly uncertain and dynamic. There is substantial variability in possible mitigation 
investment outcomes because of the large uncertainty in earthquake occurrence. 
Because the return periods of damaging earthquakes are generally tens to hundreds of 
years, a long time horizon is required for analysis. Finally, an appropriate mitigation 
plan depends on the character of risk in the specific region of interest—what is driving 
it (e.g., frequent earthquakes, vulnerable structures) and what is ―controllable.‖ Each 
mitigation strategy targets a different aspect(s) of risk, so the best combination of 
efforts will be tailored to the issues particular to the region. 
This paper describes a linear program designed to provide insight into these 
interactions and complexities of the regional earthquake risk mitigation decision 
problem and applies it to Tehran, Iran. Focusing on structural mitigation, the model 
addresses three main questions: (1) How much should be spent on pre-earthquake 
mitigation that aims to reduce future losses versus waiting until after an event and 
paying for reconstruction or simply not rebuilding damaged buildings?; (2) Which 
buildings should be mitigated and how?; and (3) Which buildings should be 
reconstructed and how? It builds on previously developed optimization models for 
regional earthquake mitigation resource allocation decision support, but as detailed in 
section 2.2, it extends those models to consider some particular issues that arise in 
seismically active developing countries like Iran. Section 2.2 summarizes the literature 
on modeling to support resource allocation for natural disaster risk management, and 
specifies how the model presented here extends that work. In section 2.3, the new 
optimization model formulation is presented, and the section 2.4 describes a case 
study application of the model for Tehran, Iran.  
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2.2 RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR NATURAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT 
2.2.1 Previously developed models  
Dodo et al. (2005) describes previous research related to resource allocation for 
natural disaster risk management by grouping it into four main approaches: 
Deterministic net present value (NPV) analysis, stochastic NPV analysis, multi-
attribute utility models, and optimization models. Deterministic NPV (or benefit-cost), 
the simplest and most common method, involves simply (1) estimating the cost of 
implementing each mitigation alternative, (2) estimating the benefits of each 
mitigation alternative, where benefits are the losses avoided by implementing the 
alternative, and (3) comparing alternatives according to net present value or a similar 
criterion. Stochastic NPV is similar, except instead of a single point estimate, a 
probability density function of the benefits of each mitigation alternative is estimated, 
where the uncertainty is due to uncertainty in earthquake occurrence. A few studies 
have used multi-attribute utility theory or other decision criteria for analyses. Finally, 
while the first three previous approaches compare a small number of predefined 
mitigation alternatives, some studies have used optimization modeling, in which a set 
of mitigation alternatives is selected to maximize some stated objective(s) subject to 
constraints. 
A few recent studies by two of the authors of this paper have used this 
optimization approach, which serves as the foundation for the new model described 
herein. Dodo et al. (2005) developed a linear program to support regional earthquake 
mitigation resource allocation and illustrated its use with a small case study area in 
Los Angeles County. The model determined which buildings—by structural type, 
occupancy type, and census tract location—should be upgraded so as to minimize total 
mitigation and expected post-earthquake reconstruction expenditures. Dodo et al. 
(2007) presented two efficient solution algorithms to solve the model for a realistic 
  51 
application area. Davidson et al. (2005) extended this model to include the objective of 
ensuring equity among various groups of people in earthquake risk management. Xu et 
al. (2007) extended the original model into a stochastic optimization that explicitly 
models the variability in annual earthquake loss (and therefore net benefit of 
mitigation investments), allowing examination of the risk-return tradeoff between the 
original objective of minimizing the sum of mitigation and expected reconstruction 
expenditures, and a second objective to minimize the chance of an unacceptably large 
loss in any one earthquake. All of these models, and the one presented in this paper, 
focus on earthquakes and a regional (metropolitan area) public sector perspective, and 
share similar definitions of mitigation alternatives. They share key strengths of 
considering all possible earthquakes while capturing spatial correlation by using 
individual earthquake scenarios (as opposed to annual expected ground shaking); 
considering a very large set of mitigation alternatives; and allowing mitigation 
investments to occur over time as they do in real life (Dodo et al. 2005).  
2.2.2 Comparison with the new model  
This paper builds on the Dodo et al. (2005) optimization modeling approach, but 
modifies it in a few key ways with an eye towards applying the model in a highly 
seismically active developing country like Iran, in which economic resources may be 
more constrained, damage more widespread, and death tolls much higher than in the 
U.S. For example the five countries with greatest number of people killed by 
earthquakes between 1980 and 2000 are all from developing countries (Table  2-1). In 
comparison, countries in the developed world with comparable seismic activity have 
much lower fatalities. Japan with 23 events during this period had 5,626 casualties and 
United States with 10 events had only 130 deaths. 
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Table ‎2-1 Countries with greatest fatalities for earthquake 1980-2000 (UNDP, 2004) 
Country Name
Number of events greater 
than 5.5 in Richter scale
Total number of 
people killed
Iran (Islamic Republic) 29 45,016
Armenia 1 23,810
Turkey 15 18,997
India 13 11,530
Mexico 15 8,545  
To capture these differences, first, the model recognizes the likely possibility that 
limited economic resources will be available for post-earthquake reconstruction by 
incorporating budget limits, and although it is treated as a less desirable alternative, if 
economically necessary, allowing the possibility that some damaged buildings will not 
be reconstructed immediately. The model keeps track of any lost building inventory 
and allows it to be rebuilt at a later time when more funds are available. Second, the 
new model expands the set of possible mitigation alternatives to allow not just 
upgrading of a particular structural type, but a change in structural type as well. This is 
essential in the case of developing countries where many fatalities are due to non-
engineered structures, such as adobe buildings, that can not be cost-effectively 
mitigated to a life safety performance level, and instead are best simply replaced by 
different structural types. Third, since a sound development plan will ideally use post-
disaster reconstruction as an opportunity to introduce safer conditions, the model 
relaxes the assumption that all buildings should be reconstructed to their pre-
earthquake condition, instead considering the possibility of reconstructing damaged 
buildings to any specified seismic design level and structural type. It also allows the 
decision maker to impose restrictions on mitigation and reconstruction decisions in 
case, for example, a certain design level or structural type is no longer allowed by the 
current building code. Finally, because death tolls may potentially be very high in a 
country like Iran, the model includes as one objective minimizing the chance of an 
extremely high death toll in any one earthquake (as well as minimizing the average 
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annual death toll across earthquakes). This involves inclusion of a risk-return tradeoff 
similar to that in Xu et al. (2007), but focusing on the risk of large life loss as opposed 
to large economic loss.  
2.3 OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
2.3.1 Scope 
The mitigation alternatives considered in the new linear program are structural 
upgrading policies for groups of buildings. Buildings are grouped into categories 
based on their census zone locations, structural types (e.g., wood, steel), occupancy 
types (e.g., residential, hospital), and seismic design levels. One mitigation alternative 
is defined as upgrading some amount of building floor area (m
2
) of a particular 
structural and occupancy type in a specified area unit (e.g., census zone) either from 
one seismic design level to another, or from one structural type to a more seismically 
resistant type (e.g., improving the design level of a steel structure or demolishing 
adobe structures and reconstructing them as reinforced concrete). Any area unit of 
analysis can be used without modifying the model formulation. The choice depends on 
data availability, computational demands, and a desire to choose a unit small enough 
that the hazard is relatively homogenous within it. From a computational perspective, 
modeling the decision variables as continuous variables (m
2
 of floor area) instead of 
integers (number of buildings) produces a much simpler optimization and more 
appropriate one given the level of data available for regional planning. For clarity of 
discussion, the model is described in section 2.3.3 in terms of census zones, but in the 
case study, the area unit used is actually a cluster of census zones (Section 2.4.2). 
The model assumes a finite set of earthquake scenarios with ―hazard-consistent‖ 
annual occurrence probabilities can be identified to represent the region’s seismicity as 
chapter one of this dissertation. This involves selecting a relatively small subset of all 
possible earthquakes and adjusting their annual occurrence probabilities so that each 
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of the subset of events represents all events ―like that one‖ in terms of the frequency 
and distribution of ground motion it causes, and together the reduced set of events 
approximate the total regional seismic hazard, as described by r-year return period 
maps based on all possible events (first chapter of this dissertation). This model only 
deals with direct loss related to structural damage and deaths, not for example, indirect 
business loss. It also focuses only on structural upgrading and replacement as 
mitigation alternatives, not land use planning, insurance, or other types of alternatives. 
Population growth over time is not considered, and it is assumed that buildings’ 
occupancy types do not change over time. Benefits and costs unrelated to earthquake 
risk are not considered. The migration of population is not considered in the model. 
The model does not allow the total floor area of each census zone exceed the initial 
value in the building inventory. 
2.3.2 Modeling approach 
Conceptually, the linear program is formulated to represent the evolving condition 
of the study area’s building inventory, described in terms of the amount of floor area 
of each structural and occupancy type in each area unit (Figure  2-1).  
 
Initial
inventory
(Xt-1)
Mitigate some
buildings
(Zt)
Update 
inventory
(Ut)
Earthquake 
damage occurs
(Yt)
Reconstruct 
some buildings
(Ht)
Lose some 
buildings
(It)
Update 
inventory
(Xt)
t-1 t t+1  
Figure ‎2-1 Evolution of building inventory in time period t, with variables used in 
model 
In each time period, decisions are first made about which buildings to mitigate and 
how. Those decisions are implemented, and then the expected annual damage occurs, 
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calculated as the product of the expected damage given an earthquake and its hazard-
consistent occurrence probability, summed over all possible earthquakes. The 
probability that a building of a given type enters a damage state after an earthquake is 
a function of the ground shaking at the site and the vulnerability of that structural type. 
While multiple damage states are possible in reality, given the precision of available 
data, it is assumed that only two damage states are possible: no damage and heavily 
damaged or collapsed. If desired, multiple damage states could be incorporated into 
the model as in Dodo et al. (2005). The model acknowledges that there may be 
insufficient resources to repair all the damage right away, and therefore the next 
decision is which buildings should be reconstructed and how (i.e., to which structural 
types and design levels). In other words, possible options after a building enters a 
damage state are to repair it to a specified structural type and design level or to not 
repair it at all, thus losing the floor area from the building inventory. The model keeps 
track of the cumulative floor area that is not reconstructed. This record of cumulative 
lost building inventory is updated after all reconstruction decisions are made. Finally, 
the state of the building inventory is updated for use in the beginning of the next time 
period.  
2.3.3 Model formulation 
Mitigation. Let , 1
c
ijk tX   be the floor area (m
2
) of buildings at the end of time period 
t-1 that are of structural type i and occupancy type j, are in census zone k, and are 
designed to seismic design level c. To simplify the notation, we defined m as a class of 
buildings in census zone k that are of occupancy type j. Without loss of generality, 
, 1
c
ijk tX   then becomes , 1
c
im tX  . The first key decision to be made in the model is which 
buildings to mitigate and how. Let ' 'i cimctZ  be the floor area of buildings (m
2
) of 
structural type i, in class m, designed to seismic design level c that are mitigated to 
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structural type i’ and seismic design level c’ during time period t. Then the mitigation 
decisions are represented by: 
 ' '
, 1 ' '
' '
, , ,c c ic i cimt im t i mc t imct
i c i c
U X Z Z i m t c      (2.1) 
where cimtU  is the floor area (m
2
) of buildings during time period t that are of 
structural type i, in class m, and designed to seismic design level c. Thus , 1
c
im tX   and 
c
imtU  describe the inventory at the beginning of the time step and after mitigation 
decisions have been implemented, respectively (Figure  2-1). Additional constraints are 
considered in the mitigation decisions. First, a building cannot be mitigated to a lower 
seismic design level. Second, buildings may not be mitigated to any structural type in 
a set Z  of extremely seismically undesirable structural types (e.g., adobe), or in a set 
DZ of undesirable design levels. Third, if the building inventory is partitioned into N 
mutually exclusive building type subsets (
nS , where (1,..., )n N ), then change in 
structural type as a mitigation choice can be implemented between buildings within set 
nS  only. For example, if the subsets are low-rise and high-rise buildings as in the case 
study, then one could mitigate a low-rise building by replacing it with another low-rise 
structural type, but not a high-rise one. These constraints are represented by Equations 
(2.2) to(2.5): 
 ' ' 0 , , , ', 'i cimctZ m t i i c c    (2.2) 
 ' ' 0 , , , , ', 'i cimct ZZ m t i c c i    (2.3) 
 ' ' 0 , , , , ', 'i cimct ZZ m t i c i c D    (2.4) 
 ' ' 0 , , , ', , 'i cimct n nZ m t c c i S i S     (2.5) 
 
Earthquake damage. If clima  is the proportion of buildings of structural type i, 
class m, and seismic design level c that will be damaged if earthquake l happens, then 
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cl
imtY , the floor area (m
2
) of buildings of structural type i, class m, and seismic design 
level c that are expected to be damaged in earthquake l in time t is: 
 , , , ,cl cl cimt im imtY a U i m c t l   (2.6) 
Reconstruction. As mentioned, one key component of the model that makes it 
more suitable for weaker economies or earthquakes causing more widespread damage 
is that it does not require the entire damaged inventory at every time period t to be 
reconstructed in the same time period. Let ' 'i cimctH  be the floor area (m
2
) of buildings 
that were of structure type i, class m, and seismic design level c before they were 
damaged and are reconstructed as structural type i’, class m, and seismic design level 
c’ in time period t. Let cimtI  be the floor area (m
2
) that are of structural type i, class m, 
and seismic design level c and are not reconstructed to any structure type by the end of 
time period t: 
 ' ', 1
' '
, , ,c c l cl i cimt im t imt imct
l i c
I I P Y H i m t c      (2.7) 
 
As with mitigation decisions, some set of structural types ( H ) or seismic design 
levels ( HD ) may be considered unacceptable options for reconstruction, perhaps 
because new seismic codes prohibit them. Thus, 
 
 ' ' 0 , , , , ', 'i cimct HH m t i c c i    (2.8) 
 ' ' 0 , , , , ', 'i cimct HH m t i c i c D    (2.9) 
Moreover, similar to mitigation choices, if a unit area of a collapsed building is 
from a subset nS , it should be rebuilt to a structural type from the same subset:  
 ' ' 0 , , , ', , 'i cimct n nH m t c c i S i S     (2.10) 
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After the effects of mitigation, earthquake damage, and reconstruction are 
determined, therefore, the total floor area (m
2
) of buildings of structural type i, class 
m, and seismic design level c at the end of the time period t is given by:  
 
 ' '
' '
, , ,c c l cl icimt imt imt i mc t
l i c
X U P Y H i c m t      (2.11) 
Budget. Recognizing financial realities, it is assumed that there is a maximum 
budget tB  to be spent in each period t. Let 
' 'i c
imcF  be the unit cost of mitigating a 
building of structural type i, class m, and seismic design level c to structural type i’ 
and seismic design level c’. Let cimR  be the unit construction cost of structural type i, 
class m, and seismic design level c. The decision of how to allocate the available 
budget between mitigation and reconstruction at every time period t is represented by: 
 ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '
c i c i c i c
im imct imc imct t
i m c i c i c m i c
R H F Z B t     (2.12) 
In practice, it may or may not be the case that mitigation and reconstruction 
expenditures are drawn from the same budget. Conceptually, however, there is a 
tradeoff between spending on pre-earthquake mitigation to reduce losses and post-
earthquake reconstruction to repair damage and this constraint allows the user to 
examine that tradeoff. If desired, one could modify the formulation by defining 
separate mitigation and reconstruction budgets.  
Risk of large death toll. A final constraint is included to represent the desire to 
guard against scenarios that would produce an unacceptably large number of 
casualties: 
 ,cl c limt im t
i m c t
Y L P t l     (2.13) 
where cimL  is the expected number of people killed if a unit area (m
2
) of building of 
structural type i, class m, and seismic design level c collapses; P is the study region’s 
initial population; the user-defined parameter [0,1]   defines ―large‖ death toll as a 
  59 
percentage of the population; and lt  is the number of deaths in earthquake l and 
period t beyond the threshold defining an unacceptably large death toll ( P ). The 
following non-negativity requirements must also hold for the decision variables: 
 , , 0 , , ,c c cimt imt imtU X I i m t c   (2.14) 
 ' ' ' ', , 0 , , , , ', 'i c i cimct imctZ H i c m t i c   (2.15) 
 0 ,lt l t    (2.16) 
 0 , , , ,climtY i m t c l   (2.17) 
Objective. The objective of the model is to minimize the total mitigation cost, 
expected post-earthquake reconstruction cost, monetary value of the total expected 
loss of life, monetary value of total building inventory lost due to limited 
reconstruction resources, and risk of a large death toll, the terms in Expression (2.18), 
respectively.  
 
' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '
i c i c c i c
imc imct im imct
i c m i c i m c i c
l c cl l l
im imt mict mict t
t i m c l i c m l
F Z R H
Min P L Y V I P  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
     (2.18) 
In this equation,  is the monetary value of a lost life; imctV  is the per-period, per 
unit floor area cost of not reconstructing buildings of structural type i, class m, and 
seismic design level c; and 0   represents a weight to characterize the relative 
importance of the objective of minimizing the chance of an extremely large death toll. 
A higher value of   represents more risk aversion. 
The final optimization model is a linear program in which the objective is given in 
Expression (2.18) and the constraints are given in Expressions (2.1) to(2.17). The 
model results indicate how to allocate the budget among mitigation ( ' 'i cimctZ ) and post-
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earthquake reconstruction decisions ( ' 'i cimctH ); and how much lost building inventory 
( cimtI ), how many deaths (
cl c
imt imY L ), and how many deaths over the ―large death toll‖ 
threshold ( l ltP  ) are expected to result. 
Input for the model can come from the region’s census, engineering hazard and 
vulnerability studies, and user-defined parameters that represent the decision-maker’s 
values. Table  2-2 summarizes the required input and where it came from for the case 
study analysis. It may be difficult to define ―correct‖ values for the user-defined 
parameters and sensitivity analyses over a range of values will likely provide more 
insight. 
Table  2-2 Summary of required input data and source of data for case study analysis 
Variable Description Source 
0
c
imx  
Inventory of buildings of structural type i, class m, and seismic 
design level c at time 0 
JICA (2000) 
P Initial population JICA (2000) 
c
imR  
Construction cost per unit area of structural type i, class m, and 
seismic design level c 
Estimated by 
authors 
' 'i c
imcF  
Unit cost of mitigating a building of structural type i, class m, 
and seismic design level c to structural type i’ and seismic 
design level c’ 
Estimated by 
authors 
cl
ima  
Proportion of buildings of structural type i, class m, and 
seismic design level c that is expected to collapse or be heavily 
damaged in earthquake l 
First chapter 
method 
lP  
Per-period ―hazard-consistent‖ occurrence probability of 
earthquake scenario l 
First chapter 
method 
imctV  
Per unit floor area cost of not reconstructing buildings of 
structural type i, class m, and seismic design level c at the end 
of time period t 
Estimated by 
authors 
c
imL  
Expected number of deaths if a unit of floor area of building of 
structural type i, class m, and seismic design level c collapses 
Applied JICA 
(2000) method 
  Penalty term in the objective function for solutions with an 
extremely large death toll 
User-defined 
  
Percentage of the population that defines an extremely large 
death toll 
User-defined 
  Monetary value of a lost life User-defined 
tB  Available budget in period t User-defined 
,
,
H Z
H Z
n
D D
S
 
 
Sets of prohibited structural types and design levels, and 
building type subsets 
User-defined 
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2.4 CASE STUDY 
2.4.1 Scope 
 
To demonstrate application of the model, a case study analysis was conducted for 
Tehran, the capital and political and economic center of Iran, one of the most 
earthquake prone countries in the world. Tehran is located at the foot of the Alborz 
Mountains, which form part of the Alps-Himalayan Orogenic Zone. It is a highly 
seismic area surrounded by many active faults. Tehran’s population has exploded in 
recent decades, growing from 1 to 7 million from 1950 to 2000 (UN 2002). Figure  2-2 
shows the location of Tehran and its surrounding faults. 
The case study analysis focuses on the ground shaking hazard, but the analysis 
could be refined by including the effects of liquefaction, landslide, or other collateral 
hazards with no or only minor modifications to the model formulation. For 
consistency, all monetary values and results are presented in terms of US dollars, 
using the 2005/06 IMF exchange rate of 9,026 Rials per US dollar (IMF 2007). 
2.4.2 Input data 
In the case study analysis, it was assumed that the time step is one year and the 
time horizon is 30 years. Part of the expected benefit from available mitigation and 
reconstruction options at every year depends on the number of remaining years for the 
city to enjoy those benefits. Therefore, to sustain incentive for the model to continue 
reconstruction or mitigation until the last years model is run for 60 years and the 
results for the first 30 years are presented. The set of earthquake scenarios assumed to 
represent the regional seismicity were the 14 earthquakes identified in the first chapter 
of this dissertation, 4 maximum credible earthquakes on specified faults and 10 other 
historical earthquakes. They are presented with their hazard-consistent annual 
occurrence probabilities in Figure  2-3 and Table  2-3. The 15th scenario is the no-
earthquake scenario with annual probability of 0.50. 
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Figure ‎2-2 Tehran’s location and its surrounding faults 
 
Figure ‎2-3 Geographic distribution of earthquake scenarios considered in case study 
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Table ‎2-3 Hazard-consistent annual occurrence probability and magnitude of the 
earthquake scenarios considered in the case study (Source: results from the first 
chapter) 
EQ ID or fault name Magnitude Hazard-consistent probability 
1 7.1 0.05 
2 7.0 0.0003 
3 7.1 0.029 
4 7.6 0.05 
5 6.4 0.05 
6 6.6 0.05 
7 7.0 0.05 
8 5.4 0.05 
9 6.7 0.0484 
10 4.1 0.0083 
11 Garmsar MCE
a
 6.9 0.05 
12 Kahrizak MCE 6.6 0.0037 
13 North Tehran MCE 6.9 0.0057 
14 Pishva MCE 6.5 0.05 
a
 MCE = Maximum credible earthquake 
According to the 1996 census survey, Tehran is divided into 3,173 census zones 
(Figure  2-4). The case study covers only 3,070 census zones from the total due to 
limited ground motion data availability. To reduce the computational intensity of the 
example, the analysis unit of the model was taken to be clusters of contiguous census 
zones that experience similar ground motions. Clusters were formed such that for each 
earthquake l, the difference in ground motion between census zones within a cluster is 
no more than 0.03g, a difference that would have little effect on the estimated damage. 
The population and building statistics of the zones were summed to create the data for 
clusters. The ground motion of the clusters was assumed to be the weighted average of 
its component zones, where weights are the number of inhabitants of each zone. The 
3,070 census zones were aggregated into 119 clusters, (1,...,119)k  (Figure  2-4). 
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Figure ‎2-4 Census zones and census zone clusters used in case study 
The statistical data on population and building inventory used in this case study 
were extracted from the data collected as part of a microzoning study of the Greater 
Tehran Area conducted by the Japan Cooperation International Agency (JICA) for the 
government of Iran (JICA 2000). Our study includes one occupancy type—residential 
(j=1), and 9 structural types, (1,...,9)i  (Table  2-4). Residential was the only 
occupancy type for which a complete set of data was available. Within the study area, 
there are 270 million m
2
 of building floor area and P=6.3 million residents. JICA 
(2000) provided the population distribution among structural types and census zones, 
and it was assumed that the number of people per m
2
 is constant across structural types 
and census zones so that the same distribution is true for floor area (Table  2-4). For 
each structural type, two seismic design levels were considered, (1,2)c , not 
mitigated and mitigated.  
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Table ‎2-4 Structural types in the case study with population distribution and unit 
mitigation and reconstruction costs in US dollars  
Structural 
type i
a 
Description 
High- 
or low-
rise 
(Sn)
b 
Population 
(%)
c 
Unit 
mitigation 
cost 
(
' 'i c
imcF )
d
 
Unit 
reconst
-ruction 
cost  
(
c
imR )
d
 
1. All wood 
(AW) 
All wood Low 0.1% 78 N/A
e 
2. Block and 
brick (BB) 
Cement block (with any type 
of roof), brick and wood or 
stone and wood, all brick or 
stone and brick  
Low 3.2% 100 166 
3. Brick and 
steel (BS) 
Brick and steel, or stone and 
steel 
Low 46.2% 78 166 
4. Reinforced 
concrete-0 
(RC0)  
Reinforced concrete, with 
more than 6 stories 
High 1.9% 122 332 
5. Reinforced 
concrete-1 
(RC1) 
Reinforced concrete, built after 
1991 and with 1 or 2 stories 
Low 0.8% 122 332 
6. Reinforced 
concrete-2 
(RC2) 
Reinforced concrete, built 
before 1991 or with more than 
3 stories  
High 7.6% 122 332 
7. Steel-1 (S1) 
Steel, built after 1992, with 1 
to 3 stories 
Low 4.4% 133 332 
8. Steel-2 (S2) 
Steel, built before 1991 or with 
more than 4 stories  
High 34.8% 122 332 
9. Sun dried 
brick (SDB) 
Sun-dried mud brick and 
wood, sun-dried mud brick and 
mud 
Low 1.1% N/A N/A 
a
 Structural type definitions and population distribution are from JICA (2000).  
b
 Authors decided to consider each structural type to be high-rise or low-rise buildings.  
c
 We assume the number of people per m
2
 is constant, so the percentages in this column are 
the same for floor area.  
d
 Unit mitigation and reconstruction costs were estimated by M. Hosseini.  
e
 N/A means mitigation or reconstruction is not allowed for the associated structural type. 
 
Figure  2-5shows the vulnerability curve for each structural type from JICA (2000). 
As in the JICA study, the ground shaking on the x-axis was converted from Modified 
Mercalli Intensity (MMI) to peak ground acceleration (PGA) using the formula in 
Trifunac and Brady (1975). To estimate the required input values clima  (i.e., the 
proportion of buildings of structural type i, class m, and seismic design level c that will 
be damaged if earthquake l happens), three attenuation relationships were applied to 
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estimate the ground shaking at the centroid of each census zone k given earthquake l, 
and a weighted average of the resulting three PGA values was calculated (as in first 
chapter of this dissertation). The weighted average of PGA values for all census zones 
in a cluster was used to estimate the PGA for the cluster, and that value was then used 
with the vulnerability curves in Figure  2-5 to estimate the probability of damage in the 
cluster for each structural type i.   
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Figure ‎2-5 Vulnerability functions of residential structural types in the case study 
 
Assuming mitigation and reconstruction costs vary by structural type but not 
census zone, and assuming that only one type of mitigation is possible, unit 
mitigation, ' 'i cimcF , and unit reconstruction costs, 
c
imR , were estimated as in Table  2-4. 
The estimations are based on expert judgment from the International Institute of 
Earthquake Engineering and Seismology of Tehran, Iran. The effect of mitigation was 
defined as a rightward shift in the fragility curve of the specified structural type so as 
to double the PGA necessary to reach the same damage ratio.  
Additional constraints were introduced to the model to make the set of mitigation 
and reconstruction alternatives more realistic. First, it was assumed that Sun dried 
(4) 
(1)    Sun Dried Brick 
(2)    Block and Brick 
(3)    All Wood 
(4)    RC-2 
(5)    RC-1 
(6)    Brick and Steel 
(7)    Steel-2 
(8)    RC-0, Steel-1 
(1) (2) 
(3) (5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
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brick is an unacceptably weak structural type that is not an option for mitigation or 
reconstruction, and All wood is not acceptable for reconstruction because there is little 
wood available for construction in Tehran currently (i.e., 1, 2Z H    ). Second, 
structural types were divided into low-rise and high-rise (N=2), and it was assumed 
that demolishing a building from one category and reconstructing it to a structural type 
from the other category was not an option. High-rise includes structural types 
Reinforced concrete-0, Reinforced concrete-2, and Steel-2; low-rise includes the 
remaining structural types (Table  2-4). 
Casualties were estimated as in JICA (2000) as a simple function of the number of 
collapsed buildings, number of people per building, occupancy at the time of the 
earthquake, percentage of occupants trapped by collapsed buildings, percentage of 
occupants killed immediately by building collapse, and percentage of injured that 
subsequently die before rescue. It was assumed that the earthquakes occur at night and 
no rescue is available. Other casualty scenarios could be incorporated with no 
modification in the model. The resulting values of cimL  (expected number of people 
who will be killed if a unit area (m
2
) of building of structural type i, class m, and 
seismic design level c collapses) are from 0 to 0.02. Note that because the model 
assumes that the number of people per m
2
 remains constant, if the total building 
inventory decreases due to delayed reconstruction, it is implicitly assumed that the 
population declines as well, reducing future deaths as well (see Section 2.4.3.6). If 
desired, alternative assumptions could be made, such as assuming the city population 
remains constant and people will crowd into remaining buildings when some are not 
rebuilt, or adding a temporary structural type to house people displaced by earthquake 
damage.  
The cost of lost building inventory was assumed to be three times the 
reconstruction cost of the same building type, assuming that it is less desirable to leave 
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inventory un-built than to reconstruct it right away. The lifetime of each building was 
assumed to be 30 years, so that a per-period value of 3 / 30cimct imV R  could be 
estimated. Depending on data availability, other factors such as indirect economic 
losses, loss of income, relocation costs, and rental losses could be the basis for 
estimating this parameter. In the base case analysis, the user-defined parameters were 
assumed to be 1  , 0.0001  , and $33,200US  . Based on the 2005 Iran national 
report (Iran 2005b), Iran spends 2.5% of its annual budget on disaster reduction and 
mitigation efforts. Assuming half of this budget is allocated to earthquake risk 
reduction, since Tehran accounts for about 26% of Iran’s GDP, and the total national 
2005 budget was about 1600 trillion Rials (Iran 2005a), we estimate a base case 
annual budget of $573tB US  million for all t. 
2.4.3 Results 
The linear optimization model was solved using AMPL software, with CPLEX by 
ILOG. The results from the model can be used to answer many questions, including: 
(1) How much should be spent on mitigation each year, and given those mitigation 
expenditures, as earthquakes occur, how much should be spent on reconstruction and 
how much building inventory should be allowed to not be rebuilt?; (2) Which 
buildings should be mitigated and how?; (3) Which buildings should be reconstructed 
and how, and which should not be rebuilt?; and (4) How do the time horizon, budget, 
and death risk aversion parameter (μ) affect the recommendations? Dissecting the 
results and investigating these and other questions can provide insight into the many 
tradeoffs in the regional earthquake risk mitigation problem. One can examine the 
tradeoffs between desires to minimize, for example, expenditures, the chance of a 
large death toll, and lost building inventory. One can also begin to understand the 
complicated, interacting influences of the different geographic patterns of ground 
shaking caused by the many possible earthquakes, distribution of the building 
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inventory across structural types, vulnerability of different structural types, budget 
constraints, and mitigation and reconstruction costs.  
2.4.3.1 Recommended expenditures over time 
Figure  2-6 shows the recommended expenditures by year for the base case 
analysis. It suggests that for the first six years, the total annual budget should be spent 
on mitigation. After year 6 the total annual budget should be spent on reconstruction. 
In the last seven years, the reconstruction expenditures drop by almost half because 
there is no remaining accumulated lost building inventory to reconstruct during those 
years. In those years, all the damage is reconstructed within the same year and almost 
half of the annual budget remains unspent.  
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Figure ‎2-6. Recommended expenditures and total cumulative lost building inventory 
for base case 
In the base case, the model recommends spending on mitigation only for the first 6 
years for two reasons. First, as Figure  2-6 shows, while money is spent on mitigation 
and not reconstruction, the floor area of buildings that are not rebuilt accumulates. 
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After six years, the objective to minimize lost inventory becomes relatively more 
important, requiring that spending switch from mitigation to reconstruction. Second, 
after the cumulative lost inventory gets to zero (year 23) no mitigation is 
recommended because there is not enough time left in the time horizon to reap the 
benefits of mitigation.  This is illustrated by Figure  2-7 which shows the 
recommended expenditures by year for the base case if the model is rerun with a 50-
year time horizon instead. In this case, when the lost inventory goes to zero in year 23, 
the balance shifts back and it is then useful to spend on mitigation again for about 7 
more years.  
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Figure ‎2-7 Recommended expenditures and total cumulative lost building inventory 
for base case for planning horizon of 50 years 
There are also differences between the mitigation choices in the two runs with 
different time horizons. First, in the case of the 50-year time horizon, amount of 
mitigated Reinforced concrete-1 increases by 2.4 times but All wood buildings are 
mitigated ten percent less in the initial periods because the longer planning horizon 
makes the more expensive investment more cost-effective. Second, in years 22 to 30, 
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the model switches back to mitigating stronger structural types that were not an 
appealing choice in the 30-year case in comparison with the benefits obtained from 
reconstructing the lost inventory. Figure  2-8 illustrates the total mitigated floor area in 
the two runs. In the 50-year time horizon, a significant amount of Brick and Steel and 
Steel-2 are mitigated in the later years of planning horizon. As explained in Section 
2.4.3.2, these structural types are among the least vulnerable types and therefore the 
expected reduction in damage is not as appealing in the beginning of the planning 
horizon in tradeoff with accumulation of lost inventory. 
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Figure ‎2-8 Recommended mitigation choices for base case for planning horizons of 
30 and 50 years. Structural types are: All wood (AW), Block and brick (BB), Brick and 
steel (BS), Reinforced concrete-0 (RC0), Reinforced concrete-1 (RC1), Reinforced 
concrete-2 (RC2), Steel-1 (S1), Steel-2 (S2), and Sun dried brick (SDB).   
2.4.3.2 Mitigation choices 
One would expect the choice of which structural types to mitigate would depend 
on a combination of factors including the relative prevalence of different types in the 
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initial inventory, the relative levels of ground shaking the different types experience 
(which depends on their locations relative to the possible earthquakes), the relative 
improvement in building performance achieved by mitigation, and their relative 
vulnerabilities and unit mitigation costs. Figure  2-9 shows the recommended total 
mitigation area by initial and final structural type.  
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Figure ‎2-9 Recommended mitigation expenditures by initial and final structural type 
for base case. Structural types are: All wood (AW), Block and brick (BB), Brick and 
steel (BS), Reinforced concrete-0 (RC0), Reinforced concrete-1 (RC1), Reinforced 
concrete-2 (RC2), Steel-1 (S1), Steel-2 (S2), and Sun dried brick (SDB).   
It suggests that mostly Reinforced concrete-2 should be mitigated. Most of the 
building inventory is Brick and steel (46%) and Steel-2 (35%), but those are two of the 
least vulnerable structural types (within their respective subgroups of low-rise and 
high-rise). Reinforced concrete-2 is the next most common structural type (8%) and is 
much more vulnerable (Figure  2-5), so it is an appealing target for mitigation. The 
choice of which structural types to mitigate seems to be driven largely by their relative 
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vulnerability. For each the four most vulnerable structural types (Sun dried brick, 
Block and brick, All wood, and Reinforced concrete-2), 59% to 92% of the initial 
inventory is mitigated; whereas for the five least vulnerable structural types, only 0% 
to 6% is. 
The structural types selected for the buildings to be mitigated to are a function of 
the constraint that they must be the same height group (low or high rise) as the initial 
structural type, and a desire to choose a structural type with both low vulnerability 
(Figure  2-5) and low mitigation cost (Table  2-4). All Reinforced concrete-2 is 
mitigated to Reinforced concrete-2. Although mitigating to Reinforced concrete-0 or 
Steel-2, the other high-rise types, which are much less vulnerable, would also have 
been possible, they would have cost $332/m
2
 instead of $122/m
2
, and thus were not 
cost-effective. Similarly, Brick and steel could have been mitigated to Steel-1, which 
is also low-rise and less vulnerable, but it would have been more expensive ($332/m
2
 
instead of $78/m
2
). All wood, Block and brick, and Reinforced concrete-1 are all 
mitigated partly to their original structural type, and partly to Brick and steel, which is 
also low-rise and is less vulnerable though more expensive. With a larger available 
annual budget, however, Brick and steel would be chosen more often (Figure  2-12). 
Finally, the model does not allow Sun dried brick to be upgraded within the same 
structural type; so instead, it is mitigated by rebuilding it as Brick and steel, the most 
cost-effective, low-rise alternative. 
Mapping the area mitigated per m
2
 of initial inventory does not reveal any 
geographic pattern. The structural types (which determine vulnerability and unit 
mitigation cost) are distributed throughout the city, and the hazard does not exhibit 
strong enough geographic variability to dominate the pattern. Trying to understand the 
combination of mitigation strategies selected makes it clear that a number a factors 
interact in a complex way to determine the relative appeal of different available 
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mitigation alternatives. It would be impossible to anticipate what the recommended 
strategy should be ahead of time, without such a model.   
2.4.3.3 Reconstruction choices 
In this model, unlike Dodo et al. (2005), the decision maker is given the option of 
not rebuilding some collapsed inventory immediately if the budget is not available to 
do so effectively. Floor area in the initial inventory then can evolve in several different 
ways. It can remain unchanged, be mitigated to a higher seismic design level or a 
different structural type, collapse and be reconstructed in the same or another 
structural type, or collapse and not be reconstructed. Figure  2-10 summarizes the 
reconstruction choices recommended by the model for the base case analysis, by 
structural type reconstructed from and to.  
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Figure ‎2-10 Recommended reconstruction expenditures by initial and final structural 
type for base case. Structural types are: All wood (AW), Block and brick (BB), Brick 
and steel (BS), Reinforced concrete-0 (RC0), Reinforced concrete-1 (RC1), 
Reinforced concrete-2 (RC2), Steel-1 (S1), Steel-2 (S2), and Sun dried brick (SDB). 
Since no cumulative lost inventory remains at the end of the base case analysis 
(Figure  2-6), all damaged buildings are eventually reconstructed. Most damaged 
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buildings are Brick and steel because they make up most of the building inventory 
(46%), and the other most common structural type, Steel-2 (35%) is one of the least 
vulnerable. The decision of which structural types to reconstruct to is similar to the 
decision of which structural types to mitigate to, except that in mitigation, there is a 
bias towards retaining the same structural type, which tends to be less expensive than 
tearing a building down and reconstructing it as a different type (unit mitigation costs 
are $78/m
2
 to $133/m
2
; unit reconstruction costs are $166/m
2
 to $332/m
2
;Table  2-4). 
For the base case analysis, the model recommends that all low-rise structural types be 
reconstructed as Brick and steel, because it is the most cost-effective low-rise type 
(Steel-1 is less vulnerable, but twice as expensive). The model recommends that all 
high-rise structural types be reconstructed as Reinforced concrete-0 or Steel-2, which 
have almost identical vulnerabilities and reconstruction costs. Reinforced concrete-2 is 
never chosen because it is more vulnerable and equally expensive. 
2.4.3.4 Sensitivity to budget 
Keeping all other parameters at their base case values, Figure  2-11 shows the 
recommended mitigation and reconstruction expenditures as a function of available 
annual budget. As the annual budget increases, a few things happen. First, mitigation 
expenditures increase suggesting that if more money is available, more should be 
spent on mitigation. Second, reconstruction expenditures increase as well, but then 
begin to decline above an annual budget of about $573 million as less accumulated 
lost inventory is available to be reconstructed. Similarly, the total expenditures 
increase, but then level off with reconstruction spending, leaving an increasing 
percentage of the annual budget unused. At the highest budget levels considered, it is 
not cost-effective to spend more on mitigation even if more funds are available. 
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Figure ‎2-11 Sensitivity of recommended expenditures to available annual budget 
The total cumulative lost building inventory decreases with annual budget because 
with more funds available, one can avoid postponing reconstruction, which is more 
expensive than reconstructing immediately after an earthquake due to the imctV  
parameter (Figure  2-11). In addition, with more funds, reconstruction choices tend 
towards less vulnerable (but more expensive) structural types, which help reduce the 
cumulative lost inventory faster. Interestingly, the annual expected number of deaths 
declines as the budget increases. As the annual budget increases from $150 million to 
$1,145 million, the annual expected number of deaths declines from 1,655 to 1,502  
(9%); whereas the cumulative lost inventory declines from 1,182 million m
2
 to 79 
million m
2
 (93%). It is more difficult to eliminate all casualties than all lost inventory 
(especially when the death risk aversion parameter μ is small, as in the base case).  
Figure  2-12 shows the sensitivity of mitigation choices to available annual budget. 
For the most part, as more funds are available, additional structural types are simply 
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added to the mitigation portfolio. In some cases, however, the strategy changes with 
the addition of more funds. For example, at an annual budget of $450 million, Block 
and brick buildings are mitigated to Block and brick (at a cost of $100/m
2
), but at an 
annual budget of $573 million, one can afford the $166/m
2
 required to mitigate Block 
and brick to Brick and steel instead, a less vulnerable structural type. When funds are 
limited, the priority is to mitigate Reinforced concrete-2. Although it is less vulnerable 
and more expensive to mitigate than Block and brick, for example, it is also much 
more expensive to reconstruct than Block and brick if it should collapse, and thus the 
benefit of the mitigation (avoided loss) is greater for Reinforced concrete-2.  
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Figure ‎2-12 Sensitivity of mitigation recommendations to available annual budget, by 
initial structural type (left column) and final structural type (right column). 
2.4.3.5 Sensitivity to death risk aversion parameter 
As the death risk aversion parameter μ increases, indicating increased importance 
of the objective to minimize the chance of a large death toll, the model has two 
mechanisms to reduce the death toll. It can spend more money on mitigation 
(reconstruction does nothing to reduce life loss). Or it can increase the cumulative lost 
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inventory, which allows more money to be spent on mitigation and reduces the 
population exposed to earthquake damage since the model assumes that the population 
is proportional to the available building floor area (Section 2.4.2) (Figure  2-13).  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0.00 0.05 0.15 0.35 0.75 1 1.5
Mu in million
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
to
ta
l 
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
 b
u
d
g
et
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
T
o
ta
l 
fl
o
o
r 
a
re
a
 (
 m
il
li
o
n
 s
q
.m
.)
Total mitigation expenditure Total reconstruction expenditure
Unspent budget Cumulative lost inventory
 
Figure ‎2-13 Sensitivity of recommended expenditures to risk parameter μ 
Increasing the cumulative lost inventory comes at a cost (reflected in the imctV  
parameter), since a city might not want to encourage emigration. Nevertheless, the 
model recommends both strategies, especially when the objective of reducing the 
chance of a large death toll becomes important, above about μ=0.35 million 
(Figure  2-13).  
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, at μ=0 in the base case analysis, 10% of the total 
budget over the 30-year time horizon remains unspent because reconstruction in the 
last seven years declines when the cumulative lost inventory goes to zero. As μ 
increases, however, the unspent budget decreases to zero because it becomes 
increasingly important to reduce the possibility of large death toll through mitigation, 
even if that requires using mitigation alternatives that were considered less cost-
effective at lower μ values (Figure  2-13).  
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As μ increases, the model recommends mitigating more, but mostly selects similar 
structural types. There are small changes, however. For example, when μ=0, a small 
amount of floor area is mitigated to Block and brick, but as μ increases above 0.35 
million, it does not anymore because that structural type is too vulnerable and too 
likely to contribute to future deaths. Similarly, as μ increases and cumulative lost 
inventory is allowed to accumulate, less total area is reconstructed, but μ does not have 
a large effect on the structural types damaged buildings are reconstructed to. 
Another interesting issue to explore is the effectiveness of different strategies in 
particular future earthquakes. That is, what should be expected in terms of number of 
deaths and damage, if one follows a recommended strategy for a specified μ, and then 
a particular earthquake occurs in Year 31? Figure 12 shows these results for the three 
most deadly earthquakes, which account for about 14%, 68%, and 16% of the annual 
expected number of deaths, respectively. For example, if one follows the strategy 
recommended when μ=0, all of the initial inventory would remain at the end of the 
time horizon in Year 30, but if Earthquake 2 occurred in Year 31, 702,000 deaths 
would result and 287 million m
2
 of floor area would be damaged. On the other hand, if 
one follows the strategy recommended when μ=1.5 million, only 89% of initial 
inventory would remain in Year 30, but if Earthquake 2 occurred in Year 31, 59% as 
many deaths (415,565) would occur and 362 million m
2
 of floor area would be 
damaged. Increasing μ from 0 to 1.5 million reduces the number of deaths by 41%, but 
does so not just by mitigating, but also by reducing the available inventory (and 
therefore the population). If instead, the North Tehran MCE or Kahrizak MCE 
occurred in Year 30, the death-lost inventory tradeoff would be less dramatic 
(Figure  2-14). This analysis demonstrates again that with a strong emphasis on 
minimizing deaths under fixed budget, the model suggests not rebuilding at all 
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because it cannot be done in a way that provides adequate life safety under a limited 
budget.  
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Figure ‎2-14 Sensitivity of death toll to risk parameter μ 
 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Regional earthquake mitigation planning is difficult because the problem is 
characterized by multiple, competing objectives; numerous alternative courses of 
action; several different types of impact (e.g., deaths, economic loss); spatial 
correlation among the impacts; substantial uncertainty; dynamism; and dependence on 
the character of risk in the specific region of interest. In this paper, a linear program is 
developed to help explore these issues, and is applied to Tehran, Iran. The linear 
program builds on previously developed models (e.g., Dodo et al. 2005), but modifies 
them to account for features of particular importance in a seismically active 
developing country like Iran. Key modifications include: (1) allowing reconstruction 
to be delayed (at a penalty) if funds are not immediately available, (2) allowing 
changes in structural types either during mitigation or reconstruction, and (3) 
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including an objective to minimize the chance of an extremely large death toll. By 
running it with different values of key parameters and carefully disaggregating the 
results, this new model can help allow risk managers to explore the complex tradeoffs 
between the objectives to minimize mitigation expenditures, expected reconstruction 
expenditures, loss of building inventory (and associated loss of population), expected 
death toll, and chance of large death toll. It can also help the user understand the 
relative importance of the budget constraint, time horizon, and other key parameters.  
Opportunities exist to continue to build on this effort, both in further modifying the 
model and in improving the input it requires. The model could be extended by 
including collateral hazards and indirect economic loss to give a more complete 
picture of the full impacts of an earthquake. If desired, one could implement an 
alternative assumption about what people do when buildings are not rebuilt 
immediately. Rather than assuming they leave the city until the inventory is rebuilt, for 
example, one could assume the population remains constant and increase the 
population density as building inventory is lost. In addition to modeling changes in the 
built environment resulting from mitigation activities, earthquake damage, and 
reconstruction efforts, the model could be modified to reflect the effects of normal 
population growth, infrastructure aging, and other non-earthquake-related changes. In 
developing countries in particular, economic instability can introduce sometime 
significant uncertainties in unit mitigation and reconstruction costs that might be 
considered in future versions. With more significant effort, the scope of the model 
might be expanded even further to include risk management alternatives other than 
structurally upgrading buildings (e.g., insurance). Finally, the results of the 
optimization model are only as good as the input data they rely on. This may be a 
particular challenge in developing countries where data are often less available or of 
lower quality. For the case study in this paper, some simplifying assumptions were 
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made in developing the input data (e.g., considering only two damage states and 
estimating the effect of mitigation as a simple shift in the fragility curves), but they are 
considered to be consistent with the state of seismic risk analysis in Tehran.  
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CHAPTER3 GEOGRAPHIC INEQUALITY IN REGIONAL EARTHQUAKE 
RISK MITIGATION PLANS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Natural disasters do not affect people equally (Mileti 1999, Nuemayer and 
Plumper 2007). In fact, due to inequalities in exposure, and access to resources and 
opportunities, certain segments of the population are more likely to suffer from deaths, 
damages and economic losses than the others and some groups are less likely to be 
able to recover from loss when they experience it. There is a significant body of work 
investigating these differences in population segments using a number of 
characteristics, including gender (Nuemayer and Plumper 2007, Peacock et al. 1998), 
income (Philips 1993), age (Bolin and Stanford 1998), and ethnicity (Peacock et al. 
1987). 
In the context of providing public services and managing public sector resources, 
efficiency is not adequate. Savas (1978) introduces effectiveness and equity as 
measures that should be considered in providing public goods and services in addition 
to efficiency. Efficiency measures the cost to provide the service relative to the rate-
of-return of providing it. Effectiveness is defined as the adequacy of services relative 
to the need and incorporates the notion of service quality. Equity refers to the fairness 
and impartiality of provided service. Athanassopoulos (1998) and Boiney (1995) 
develop models to incorporate these criteria in the decision making process for 
allocation of public goods. 
Resource allocation for regional earthquake risk mitigation is an intervening act by 
a central decision maker (governmental body for instance) with consequences that 
may impact different groups of people in different ways. As Boiney (1995) argues, in 
such an act the decision maker’s task is to assess the preferences and tradeoffs of those 
concerned and identify a defensible and implementable option. To be successful in 
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doing so requires attention to fairness. While Chapter 2 of this dissertation focuses on 
developing a framework to aid the selection of the most efficient option in the 
allocation of resources for earthquake risk management, this chapter begins to 
consider impacts on equity. This analysis aims to build awareness about identification 
of vulnerable groups and provide insight on the issue of fairness and how it is affected 
by different decision parameters. The equity in regional earthquake risk mitigation is 
discussed in the next section followed by a brief introduction to Lorenz curves and 
their application in inequity comparisons. An illustrative analysis of this application in 
Tehran, Iran is then described. 
3.2 EQUITY IN REGIONAL EARTHQUAKE RISK MANAGEMENT 
Davidson et al. (2005) provide an excellent discussion of key challenges that must 
be addressed in incorporating equity into regional earthquake risk mitigation. First, 
what groups of people or facilities should be examined with respect to equity? Second, 
what equity principle should be used, such as horizontal (similar people or facilities 
should be treated equally) or vertical equity (different people or facilities might need 
different treatments). Third, the equity principle could be applied to initial allocation 
(funds spent), final outcome (final risk or expected losses after risk reduction effort), 
or process by which risk reduction efforts are allocated. Fourth, one should define 
exactly what it is that should be distributed equitably among facilities or people. For 
example, the discussed outcome could be average per capita earthquake loss, 
percentage reduction in per person expected loss, or average earthquake loss for the 
whole group. Fifth, what metric should be used to best capture and address the specific 
characteristics and circumstances of the problem at hand? 
Davidson et al.(2005) develop a linear optimization model based on Dodo et 
al.(2005) using the  Gini coefficient. The optimization distributes resources for 
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earthquake mitigation so that the amount f ―inequality‖ in per capita loss does not pass 
a threshold. The people group was based on income. 
3.3 LORENZ CURVE AND EQUALITY COMPARISONS 
The Lorenz curve is a graphical depiction of cumulative percentage of a certain 
characteristic, such as size or income, against cumulative percentage of (ordered) 
population, Figure  3-1(Lorenz 1905). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3-1 Lorenz curve when distribution X Lorenz dominates distribution Y (Fields 
2001) 
Since for a certain characteristic A, the population of recipients is ordered from 
lowest to highest, the change in the cumulative percentage of A is always larger for 
recipient i than it is for recipient i-1, and therefore the Lorenz curve always has a 
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convex shape (Figure  3-1). In the case of perfect equality in distribution, the curve is a 
45° line, and for any distribution, the closer its Lorenz curve to this line, the more 
equal it is. In general, for two distributions X and Y, if the Lorenz curve for 
distribution X lies somewhere above and never below the Lorenz curve for 
distribution Y, then X is said to Lorenz-dominate Y, denoted X YL L  (Figure  3-1).  
If the measure of equity is assumed to be the Lorenz curve of the distribution, then 
if one distribution Lorenz-curve dominates another, it is more equal than the 
dominated one. This conclusion however is not always consistent with what is derived 
based on the numerical inequality measures.  
Numerical inequality measures are defined to be a function (.) : nI R R  
determining how much inequality there is for a given vector of characteristic A. Some 
of the most common inequality measures in the literature are share of the richest x 
percent and poorest y percent, R%-P% ratio, Gini coefficient, Theil’s measure, 
Atkinson’s measure, variance, standard deviation, and log variance.  
Gini coefficient is defined as the ratio of the areas in the Lorenz Curve 
(Figure  3-1). If the area between the perfect equality and Lorenz Curve is A and the 
area under the Lorenz Curve is B then the Gini coefficient is A/(A+B). The Gini 
coefficient of zero indicates perfect equality and a value of one indicates perfect 
inequality. Expression (3.1) shoes Theil’s measure where xi is the income (or any other 
characteristic) of recipient i, x  is the average income, and n is the total number of 
recipients. 
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  
  (3.1) 
The first term inside the sum can be considered individual’s share of aggregate 
income and the second term is that person’s income relative to the mean. If everyone 
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has the same income (mean) then the index is zero and if one has all the income the 
index is equal to n. Expression(3.2) shows Atkinson’s measure of inequality.  
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Atkinson’s measure has the special feature that it is able to gauge the movement in 
different segments of the income with the weight . The measure becomes more 
sensitive to the changes at the lower end of the income as    approaches one. 
In ordering distributions based on their inequality, these numerical measures may 
or may not have the same outcome as the Lorenz-dominance. Fields (2001) divides 
inequality measures into three sets based on how they treat situations of Lorenz-
dominance: 
Inequality measure (.)I is: 
1. Strongly Lorenz-consistent if when X YL L then ( ) ( )I X I Y and when LX 
coincides with LY then ( ) ( )I X I Y . Examples are the Gini coefficient, 
Theil’s two measures, the Atkinson index, and the coefficient of variation. 
2. Weakly Lorenz-consistent if when X YL L then ( ) ( )I X I Y  when LX 
coincides with LY then ( ) ( )I X I Y . Examples are share of the richest x 
percent and poorest y percent, R%-P% ratio, and the relative mean 
deviation. 
3. Lorenz-inconsistence if ever, when  X YL L  then ( ) ( )I X I Y . Examples 
are the variance, standard deviation, and the log variance. 
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As Davidson et al. (2005) points out, one of the challenges in equity analysis in 
regional earthquake risk mitigation is choosing the appropriate measure. However, if 
one distribution Lorenz-dominates another, then using the Lorenz Curve as the basis 
of comparison has the advantage that the conclusion can be extended to several 
strongly and weakly Lorenz-consistent measures that are widely used in the literature.  
Therefore, Lorenz curve comparisons can be a valid starting point. However, if the 
two curves cross, no dominance conclusion can be derived, and inequality of the 
distributions can not be compared using the Lorenz criterion alone. In such a case, the 
challenge of picking the appropriate measure entails close understanding of the 
decision maker’s judgment and goals. Gini coefficient can also provide the same 
results because it is defined based on the Lorenz Curves. 
3.4 ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYSIS 
This section describes analysis of the results of the optimization model developed 
in the Chapter 2 from an equity perspective. The scope of the analysis is limited data is 
availability, but nevertheless is helpful in providing initial insights in to the interaction 
between efficiency and equity and its sensitivity to key parameters. 
The analysis is based on comparison of differences in the distribution of damage 
(number of collapsed buildings per 1000 people) among different building clusters. 
Lorenz-curves of these distributions are drawn for the base case of Chapter 2 as well 
as variations in available annual budget and ―death risk parameter‖. 
3.4.1 Scope 
The analysis is done for the 119 census zone clusters defined in Section 2.4 for 
Tehran, Iran. The study includes nine structural types (Table  2-4) and only residential 
occupancy. The total number of dwellings of each structure type i in each cluster k is 
given for the initial inventory of the buildings. Figure  3-8  to Figure  3-17 in the 
Appendix show the spatial distribution of the population and the different structural 
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types in the study area as a percentage of their total number. As explained in Section 
2.4.2, the area of a typical building of structure type i in cluster k is used to convert the 
model damage results (Y variable) from total square meters lost to total number of 
buildings lost. 
The analysis is based on the spatial distribution of damages. The buildings are 
grouped by their location. That is, all the buildings in each cluster belong to one group 
and it is assumed that all clusters should be treated equally (horizontal equity). This 
choice has been made because there is no data on income or other characteristics 
which might be more appropriate in identifying vulnerable groups. The analyses are 
outcome-based. The outcome is the total number of collapsed buildings per 1000 
people. The equality comparisons are based on Lorenz curve analyses. 
3.4.2 Results 
3.4.2.1 Spatial distribution of loss 
Figure  3-2 (figures are in UTM-WGS84, Zone 39N) shows the spatial distribution 
of damage in Tehran for the base case analysis (Section 2.4) as the total number of 
collapsed buildings over all 30 year planning horizon per thousand people. In general, 
overlaying such spatial distribution of damage on maps of different characteristics 
distribution in data, such as income distribution or similar indicators of vulnerable 
groups, will give the decision maker a clearer picture of the situation and will assist 
them in devising a more defensible policy. 
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Figure ‎3-2 Number of collapsed buildings per 1000 people for the base case 
 
Since the total damage in the planning horizon is a combination of many factors 
such as spatial distribution of different structure types, their vulnerability, the hazard 
they are exposed to and the decisions the model makes over the planning horizon for 
mitigation and reconstruction, it is hard to exactly explain specific factors behind this 
damage distribution. However, in terms of equality implications one notes that there is 
a significant concentration in the central and southern parts of the city, indicating 
unequal distribution of damage among residents in different areas. Considering the 
reconstruction cost and vulnerability of different structure types (Table  2-4, 
Figure  2-5) one can assume that structure types All wood, Block and brick, Brick and 
steel, and Sun dried brick are associated with lower income classes and Reinforced 
concrete and Steel structures are associated with higher incomes. Looking at the 
spatial distribution of the different structure types (Appendix) it is clear that the 
structure types associated with lower incomes are also mostly concentrated in central 
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and southern parts of the city. These two coinciding patterns suggest that the lower 
income class of residents may be shouldering the majority of damages in the city. 
Presenting the same data from a different perspective, the Lorenz curve of damage 
distribution per thousand people is illustrated in Figure  3-3. This graph shows that 
60% of the damage is concentrated in 40% of the population suggesting rather unequal 
distribution of damage among residents. Since the distribution of damage is a negative 
term it is desired to be distributed among the population as evenly as possible. 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percentage of total population
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
to
ta
l 
d
a
m
a
g
e
Available annual budget
$573 million
Perfect equity
 
Figure ‎3-3 Lorenz curve for damage distribution among population for the base case 
3.4.2.2 Sensitivity to annual available budget 
Results are compared for the base case and highest available annual budgets used 
in Section 2.4.3—US$573 and US$1,145 million, respectively. Figure  3-4 shows the 
Lorenz-curve for the two budgets. As this figure illustrates, the two Lorenz curves 
cross. For the 20% of the population that receives only about 10% of the damage the 
Lorenz curve of $1,145 million dollars is actually above that of the base case. This 
might suggest that the higher income people may in fact be receiving greater 
proportion of benefits from an equity perspective. In general however, the cross of the 
two curves means that no dominance conclusions can be derived from the graph alone. 
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However, one could conclude that increasing the available annual budget does not 
necessarily decrease the inequality of damage distribution and the final conclusion will 
in fact be dependent on the inequality measure used.  
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percentage of total population
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
to
ta
l 
d
a
m
a
g
e
Perfect equity
Available annual budget $573 million
Available annual budget $1,145 million
 
Figure ‎3-4 Lorenz curve comparison for base case and when budget is 1145 million 
US dollars 
 
Figure ‎3-5 Number of collapsed buildings per 1000 people for the budget of 1,145 
million US dollars 
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Figure  3-5shows the damage distribution for the budget of US$1,145 million as 
the total number of collapsed buildings per thousand people. Compared to Figure  3-2 
it shows that over all number of collapsed buildings has decreased but the rate of this 
decrease is greater in central zones than the northern and eastern parts. 
 
3.4.2.3 Sensitivity to death risk aversion parameter 
Figure  3-6 shows the Lorenz curves for the base case (budget of $573 million and 
risk parameter µ=0) and the case in which µ=1 million. In this case, the damage 
distribution of the base case is Lorenz-dominant the damage distribution of µ=1 
million. This means that putting more emphasize on guarding against casualties of rare 
but big earthquakes in fact increases the inequality in the damage distribution in the 
city in this analysis. 
Looking at the spatial damage distribution in the city for µ=1million (Figure  3-7), 
it is obvious that the model has reduced the damage in southern clusters adjacent to 
earthquake 2 and 12 (Kahrizak Fault Maximum Credible Earthquake) as well as in 
northern clusters adjacent to earthquake 11 (Northern Tehran Fault Maximum 
Credible Earthquake) (Figure  2-3). The damage for the more central clusters on the 
other hand is increased because these central clusters are not adjacent to any major 
events, which means that as the model increasingly emphasizes guarding against large 
death risk, it drives resources away from clusters with less death risk. This creates the 
sort of spatial inequality that is illustrated in Figure  3-6and Figure  3-7 
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Figure ‎3-6 Lorenz curve comparison for base case and when µ is one million 
 
Figure ‎3-7 Number of collapsed buildings per 1000 people for the µ=1million 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the concept of equity in regional earthquake risk mitigation 
investment was explored. A brief review on the concept of Lorenz-curve dominance 
and its relationship to inequality comparisons was provided. An illustrative analysis on 
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the result of the mathematical model developed in Chapter 2 provides a simplified 
demonstration of how equity might be interpreted from these results.  
Opportunities exist to continue to build on this effort. The model could be 
extended to allow relocation of current population in the city. Currently it is assumed 
that the total floor area of building inventory and population in each cluster can not 
exceed the initial value. This means that population from clusters with more hazard 
exposure can not relocate to places with lower hazard level. In reality, relocation 
might be a cost effective way to reduce the over all risk and improve the equity in 
distribution of damage. Although it might also increase the overall risk due to over 
population of some areas that are considered safe and creating secondary risks. When 
Lorenz curves cross different numerical measures can be calculated to explore the 
implications of different parameters for equity in damage distribution. The analysis 
can significantly improve in identifying and tracking the vulnerable groups with 
regard to equity if better data is available on population segmentation such as income 
or ethnicity. If the model improves to consider uncertainties in the costs then this 
might have different impacts on lower and higher income segments (lower income 
might have less tolerance for uncertainty) and might have specific implications on 
equity of damage distribution. Similar to Davidson et al.(2005) different numerical 
measures can be incorporated into the optimization as specific constraints. 
.  
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APPENDIX 
This appendix consists of maps of the distribution of initial population and initial 
building inventory for each structure type as a percentage of total of that type. 
 
Figure ‎3-8 Initial population distribution in 1000 people 
 
Figure ‎3-9 The distribution of All Wood structures in the initial inventory as a 
percentage of total number of buildings in that structural type 
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Figure ‎3-10 The distribution of Block and Brick structures in the initial inventory as a 
percentage of total number of buildings in that structural type 
 
 
Figure ‎3-11 The distribution of Brick and Steel structures in the initial inventory as a 
percentage of total number of buildings in that structural type 
  100 
 
Figure ‎3-12 The distribution of Reinforced Concrete-0 structures in the initial 
inventory as a percentage of total number of buildings in that structural type 
 
Figure ‎3-13 The distribution of Reinforced Concrete-1 structures in the initial 
inventory as a percentage of total number of buildings in that structural type 
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Figure ‎3-14 The distribution of Reinforced Concrete-2  structures in the initial 
inventory as a percentage of total number of buildings in that structural type 
 
Figure ‎3-15 The distribution of Steel-1 structures in the initial inventory as a 
percentage of total number of buildings in that structural type 
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Figure ‎3-16 The distribution of Steel-2 structures in the initial inventory as a 
percentage of total number of buildings in that structural type 
 
Figure ‎3-17 The distribution of Sun Dried Brick structures in the initial inventory as a 
percentage of total number of buildings in that structural type 
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